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EUVD-2026-317290

fkie_cve-2026-43874

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 29.0, the server-side mitigation for the YPTSocket autoEvalCodeOnHTML eval sink (from CVE-2026-40911) only strips the payload when it sits under $json['msg'], but the relay function msgToResourceId() selects the outbound message from $msg['json'] before $msg['msg']. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a WebSocket token from plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php, connect to the WebSocket server, and send a message with autoEvalCodeOnHTML nested under a top-level json field — the strip branch is skipped, the relay delivers the payload verbatim to any logged-in user identified by to_users_id, and the client script runs it through eval(). Commit 9f3006f9a89a34daa67a83c6ad35f450cb91fcce contains an updated fix.

GHSA-ghcv-22jf-vfxm — AVideo has an Incomplete Fix for YPTSocket autoEvalCodeOnHTML Strip: Unauthenticated Cross-User JavaScript Execution vi…

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

## Summary

The server-side mitigation for the YPTSocket `autoEvalCodeOnHTML` eval sink (prior advisory GHSA-gph2-j4c9-vhhr, commit `c08694bf6`) only strips the payload when it sits under `$json['msg']`, but the relay function `msgToResourceId()` selects the outbound message from `$msg['json']` *before* `$msg['msg']`. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain a WebSocket token from `plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php`, connect to the WebSocket server, and send a message with `autoEvalCodeOnHTML` nested under a top-level `json` field — the strip branch is skipped, the relay delivers the payload verbatim to any logged-in user identified by `to_users_id`, and the client script runs it through `eval()`.

## Details

### Entry point (unauthenticated)

`plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php` (lines 1–21) issues a valid WebSocket token to any caller, with no authentication or CSRF check:

```php $obj->webSocketToken = getEncryptedInfo(0); $obj->webSocketURL = YPTSocket::getWebSocketURL(); die(json_encode($obj)); ```

`getEncryptedInfo()` defaults to `sentFrom = 'browser'` and a non-CLI flag (`plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:3-47`), so a token minted for an anonymous browser client will cause the strip branch below to run — which is exactly what we want to audit.

### Incomplete strip (the fix from commit c08694bf6)

`plugin/YPTSocket/Message.php:236-247`:

```php // Strip eval-able fields from browser/guest messages. if (empty($msgObj->isCommandLineInterface) && ($msgObj->sentFrom…