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      <title>EUVD-2026-288756</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-288756</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-288756</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-288756</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-4300</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-4300</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Robo Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;Loading Label&amp;#39; setting in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.3. The plugin uses a custom `|***...***|` marker pattern in its `fixJsFunction()` method to embed raw JavaScript function references within JSON-encoded configuration objects. When a gallery&amp;#39;s options are rendered on the frontend, `json_encode()` wraps all string values in double quotes. The `fixJsFunction()` method then strips the `&amp;#34;|***` and `***|&amp;#34;` sequences, effectively converting a JSON string value into raw JavaScript code. The Loading Label field (stored as `rbs_gallery_LoadingWord` post_meta) is an `rbstext` type field that is sanitized with `sanitize_text_field()` on save. While this strips HTML tags, it does not strip the `|***...***|` markers since they contain no HTML. When a user inputs `|***alert(document.domain)***|`, the value passes through sanitization intact, is stored in post_meta, and is later retrieved and output within an inline `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` tag via `renderMainBlock()` with the quote markers stripped — resulting in arbitrary JavaScript execution. The gallery post type uses `capability_type =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;post&amp;#39;`, allowing Author-level users to create galleries. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses a page containing the gallery shortcode.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Robo Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;Loading Label&amp;#39; setting in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.3. The plugin uses a custom `|***...***|` marker pattern in its `fixJsFunction()` method to embed raw JavaScript function references within JSON-encoded configuration objects. When a gallery&amp;#39;s options are rendered on the frontend, `json_encode()` wraps all string values in double quotes. The `fixJsFunction()` method then strips the `&amp;#34;|***` and `***|&amp;#34;` sequences, effectively converting a JSON string value into raw JavaScript code. The Loading Label field (stored as `rbs_gallery_LoadingWord` post_meta) is an `rbstext` type field that is sanitized with `sanitize_text_field()` on save. While this strips HTML tags, it does not strip the `|***...***|` markers since they contain no HTML. When a user inputs `|***alert(document.domain)***|`, the value passes through sanitization intact, is stored in post_meta, and is later retrieved and output within an inline `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` tag via `renderMainBlock()` with the quote markers stripped — resulting in arbitrary JavaScript execution. The gallery post type uses `capability_type =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;post&amp;#39;`, allowing Author-level users to create galleries. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses a page containing the gallery shortcode.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-4300</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-f324-cf3c-hqgv</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f324-cf3c-hqgv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Robo Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;Loading Label&amp;#39; setting in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.3. The plugin uses a custom `|***...***|` marker pattern in its `fixJsFunction()` method to embed raw JavaScript function references within JSON-encoded configuration objects. When a gallery&amp;#39;s options are rendered on the frontend, `json_encode()` wraps all string values in double quotes. The `fixJsFunction()` method then strips the `&amp;#34;|***` and `***|&amp;#34;` sequences, effectively converting a JSON string value into raw JavaScript code. The Loading Label field (stored as `rbs_gallery_LoadingWord` post_meta) is an `rbstext` type field that is sanitized with `sanitize_text_field()` on save. While this strips HTML tags, it does not strip the `|***...***|` markers since they contain no HTML. When a user inputs `|***alert(document.domain)***|`, the value passes through sanitization intact, is stored in post_meta, and is later retrieved and output within an inline `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` tag via `renderMainBlock()` with the quote markers stripped — resulting in arbitrary JavaScript execution. The gallery post type uses `capability_type =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;post&amp;#39;`, allowing Author-level users to create galleries. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses a page containing the gallery shortcode.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Robo Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the &amp;#39;Loading Label&amp;#39; setting in all versions up to, and including, 5.1.3. The plugin uses a custom `|***...***|` marker pattern in its `fixJsFunction()` method to embed raw JavaScript function references within JSON-encoded configuration objects. When a gallery&amp;#39;s options are rendered on the frontend, `json_encode()` wraps all string values in double quotes. The `fixJsFunction()` method then strips the `&amp;#34;|***` and `***|&amp;#34;` sequences, effectively converting a JSON string value into raw JavaScript code. The Loading Label field (stored as `rbs_gallery_LoadingWord` post_meta) is an `rbstext` type field that is sanitized with `sanitize_text_field()` on save. While this strips HTML tags, it does not strip the `|***...***|` markers since they contain no HTML. When a user inputs `|***alert(document.domain)***|`, the value passes through sanitization intact, is stored in post_meta, and is later retrieved and output within an inline `&amp;lt;script&amp;gt;` tag via `renderMainBlock()` with the quote markers stripped — resulting in arbitrary JavaScript execution. The gallery post type uses `capability_type =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;post&amp;#39;`, allowing Author-level users to create galleries. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Author-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses a page containing the gallery shortcode.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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