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EUVD-2026-322098

fkie_cve-2026-42786

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion.

The fragment reassembly path in 'Elixir.Bandit.WebSocket.Connection':handle_frame/3 in lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex appends every incoming Continuation{fin: false} frame's payload to a per-connection iolist with no cumulative size cap. The existing max_frame_size option only bounds individual frames; a peer that streams an unbounded number of continuation frames without ever setting fin=1 grows BEAM heap linearly until the OS or a supervisor kills the process.

Because the accumulation happens before WebSock.handle_in/2 is called, the application has no opportunity to interpose a size check. Phoenix Channels and LiveView both run over WebSock on Bandit, so a stock Phoenix application exposes this surface as soon as it accepts socket connections.

This issue affects bandit: from 0.5.0 before 1.11.0.

GHSA-pf94-94m9-536p — Bandit Buffers Unbounded WebSocket Continuation Frames, Allowing Unauthenticated Memory Exhaustion

Affected: Hex: bandit

### Summary A single unauthenticated WebSocket client can exhaust server memory in any Bandit-fronted application that accepts WebSocket connections. The fragmented-message reassembly path appends every `Continuation{fin: false}` frame's payload to a per-connection iolist with no cumulative size cap, so a peer that streams continuation frames indefinitely (never setting `fin=1`) grows BEAM heap linearly until the OS or a supervisor kills the process. `max_frame_size` only bounds individual frames; there is no `max_message_size` option available today.

### Details The bug is in `lib/bandit/websocket/connection.ex`, in the fragment branch of `handle_frame/3` (around lines 80–95). When a non-final continuation arrives, Bandit builds the next accumulator as `[connection.fragment_frame.data | frame.data]` with no running byte-count check. A peer can therefore stream max-sized continuations forever and grow BEAM resident memory without bound. When `fin=1` finally arrives (if ever), `IO.iodata_to_binary/1` flattens the whole iolist, briefly doubling peak memory. The attacker does not need to send `fin=1` — simply holding the connection open is enough to pin the bytes.

**Suggested fix:** track a running cumulative byte count on the connection state and add a configurable `max_message_size`. When exceeded, terminate the connection with RFC 6455 close code 1009 (`:max_message_size_exceeded`) instead of continuing to append.

### PoC A self-contained reproduction script is below. It…