<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 06:55:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-317411</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317411</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-317411</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317411</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42606</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42606</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;AzuraCast is a self-hosted, all-in-one web radio management suite. Prior to version 0.23.6, the ApplyXForwarded middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker&amp;#39;s server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim&amp;#39;s password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 0.23.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;AzuraCast is a self-hosted, all-in-one web radio management suite. Prior to version 0.23.6, the ApplyXForwarded middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-Host HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker&amp;#39;s server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim&amp;#39;s password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 0.23.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42606</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8 — AzuraCast has Password Reset Poisoning via Untrusted X-Forwarded-Host Header that Leads to Account Takeover and 2FA Byp…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: azuracast/azuracast&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `ApplyXForwarded` middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker&amp;#39;s server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim&amp;#39;s password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause 1: Unconditional X-Forwarded-Host Trust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php:35-40`:
```php
if ($request-&amp;gt;hasHeader(&amp;#39;X-Forwarded-Host&amp;#39;)) {
    $hasXForwardedHeader = true;
    $xfHost = Types::stringOrNull($request-&amp;gt;getHeaderLine(&amp;#39;X-Forwarded-Host&amp;#39;), true);
    if (null !== $xfHost) {
        $uri = $uri-&amp;gt;withHost($xfHost);
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation that the request originates from a trusted reverse proxy. Any direct client can set this header and it will be accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the default Docker deployment, nginx&amp;#39;s PHP location block (`util/docker/web/nginx/azuracast.conf.tmpl:150-171`) uses `fastcgi_pass` with `include fastcgi_params`. Standard nginx behavior passes all client HTTP headers through to PHP-FPM as `HTTP_*` parameters. The `proxy_params.conf` file — which explicitly sets `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` — only applies to `proxy_pass` directives (we…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: azuracast/azuracast&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `ApplyXForwarded` middleware unconditionally trusts the client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host` HTTP header with no trusted proxy allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the password reset URL sent to any user by injecting this header when triggering the forgot-password flow. When the victim clicks the poisoned link, their reset token is exfiltrated to the attacker&amp;#39;s server. The attacker then uses the token on the real instance to reset the victim&amp;#39;s password and destroy their 2FA configuration, achieving full account takeover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause 1: Unconditional X-Forwarded-Host Trust&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`backend/src/Middleware/ApplyXForwarded.php:35-40`:
```php
if ($request-&amp;gt;hasHeader(&amp;#39;X-Forwarded-Host&amp;#39;)) {
    $hasXForwardedHeader = true;
    $xfHost = Types::stringOrNull($request-&amp;gt;getHeaderLine(&amp;#39;X-Forwarded-Host&amp;#39;), true);
    if (null !== $xfHost) {
        $uri = $uri-&amp;gt;withHost($xfHost);
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no validation that the request originates from a trusted reverse proxy. Any direct client can set this header and it will be accepted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the default Docker deployment, nginx&amp;#39;s PHP location block (`util/docker/web/nginx/azuracast.conf.tmpl:150-171`) uses `fastcgi_pass` with `include fastcgi_params`. Standard nginx behavior passes all client HTTP headers through to PHP-FPM as `HTTP_*` parameters. The `proxy_params.conf` file — which explicitly sets `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` — only applies to `proxy_pass` directives (we…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gv7r-3mr9-h5x8</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
