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EUVD-2026-318465

fkie_cve-2026-42602

azureauthextension is the Azure Authenticator Extension. From 0.124.0 to 0.150.0, a server-side authentication bypass in azureauthextension allows any party who holds a single valid Azure access token for any scope the collector's configured identity can mint for to authenticate to any OpenTelemetry receiver that uses auth: azure_auth. The extension's Authenticate method does not validate incoming bearer tokens as JWTs. Instead, it calls its own configured credential to obtain an access token and compares the client's token to the result with string equality — and the scope for that server-side token request is taken from the client-supplied Host header. As a result, a token minted for any Azure resource the service principal has ever been issued a token for (ARM, Graph, Key Vault, Storage, etc.) will authenticate to the collector if the attacker picks a matching Host. Tokens are replayable for the full issued lifetime (commonly several hours for managed identity tokens).

GHSA-pjv4-3c63-699f — opentelemetry-collector-contrib's azureauthextension Authenticate method does not validate bearer tokens, allowing auth…

Affected: Go: github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector-contrib/extension/azureauthextension

### Summary

A server-side authentication bypass in `azureauthextension` allows any party who holds a single valid Azure access token for *any scope the collector's configured identity can mint for* to authenticate to any OpenTelemetry receiver that uses `auth: azure_auth`. The extension's `Authenticate` method does not validate incoming bearer tokens as JWTs. Instead, it calls its own configured credential to obtain an access token and compares the client's token to the result with string equality — and the scope for that server-side token request is taken from the client-supplied `Host` header. As a result, a token minted for any Azure resource the service principal has ever been issued a token for (ARM, Graph, Key Vault, Storage, etc.) will authenticate to the collector if the attacker picks a matching `Host`. Tokens are replayable for the full issued lifetime (commonly several hours for managed identity tokens).

Severity: High (CVSS 8.1). See "Threat model" below for the preconditions that inform that score.

### Root cause

The extension implements both `extensionauth.HTTPClient` (outbound: "attach my identity to requests I send") and `extensionauth.Server` (inbound: "validate a credential someone presented to me"). Those two interfaces look symmetric but are not: holding a credential to present says nothing about the ability to validate a credential someone else presents. The outbound path only requires `credential.GetToken()`; the inbound path requires JWT signature…