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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-318615</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318615</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318615</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318615</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42595</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42595</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium URL-to-PDF endpoint (/forms/chromium/convert/url) has no default protection against HTTP/HTTPS-based SSRF. The default deny-list regex only blocks file:// URIs. An unauthenticated attacker can point Chromium at any internal IP — including loopback, RFC 1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints — and receive the response rendered as a PDF. Additionally, even when operators configure a custom deny-list, the protection is bypassed via HTTP redirects. Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium instance follows 302 redirects from an attacker-controlled external URL to internal targets without re-validating the redirect destination against the deny-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium URL-to-PDF endpoint (/forms/chromium/convert/url) has no default protection against HTTP/HTTPS-based SSRF. The default deny-list regex only blocks file:// URIs. An unauthenticated attacker can point Chromium at any internal IP — including loopback, RFC 1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints — and receive the response rendered as a PDF. Additionally, even when operators configure a custom deny-list, the protection is bypassed via HTTP redirects. Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium instance follows 302 redirects from an attacker-controlled external URL to internal targets without re-validating the redirect destination against the deny-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42595</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-chwh-f6gm-r836 — Gotenberg: Server-Side Request Forgery via Chromium URL Endpoint with Redirect-Based Deny-List Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-chwh-f6gm-r836</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A review of 4 published Gotenberg security advisories exposed an SSRF issue. GHSA-pjrr-jgp4-v2fm covers SSRF via the `downloadFrom` endpoint. GHSA-pcrp-7g9h-7qhp covers SSRF via the `webhook` endpoint. Neither advisory addresses SSRF through the primary Chromium URL-to-PDF conversion endpoint (`/forms/chromium/convert/url`), which has no default deny-list for HTTP/HTTPS targets. The redirect-based deny-list bypass described here also applies to `downloadFrom` and `webhook` but is a separate finding from the initial request validation those advisories cover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium URL-to-PDF endpoint (`/forms/chromium/convert/url`) has no default protection against HTTP/HTTPS-based SSRF. The default deny-list regex only blocks `file://` URIs. An unauthenticated attacker can point Chromium at any internal IP — including loopback, RFC 1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints — and receive the response rendered as a PDF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, even when operators configure a custom deny-list, the protection is bypassed via HTTP redirects. Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium instance follows `302` redirects from an attacker-controlled external URL to internal targets without re-validating the redirect destination against the deny-list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What makes this particularly notable is that Gotenberg&amp;#39;s secondary features — `downloadFrom` and `webhook` — ship with default deny-lists that explicitly block RFC 1918 and link-local addresses. The primary feature, the one that literally takes a URL and fe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A review of 4 published Gotenberg security advisories exposed an SSRF issue. GHSA-pjrr-jgp4-v2fm covers SSRF via the `downloadFrom` endpoint. GHSA-pcrp-7g9h-7qhp covers SSRF via the `webhook` endpoint. Neither advisory addresses SSRF through the primary Chromium URL-to-PDF conversion endpoint (`/forms/chromium/convert/url`), which has no default deny-list for HTTP/HTTPS targets. The redirect-based deny-list bypass described here also applies to `downloadFrom` and `webhook` but is a separate finding from the initial request validation those advisories cover.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium URL-to-PDF endpoint (`/forms/chromium/convert/url`) has no default protection against HTTP/HTTPS-based SSRF. The default deny-list regex only blocks `file://` URIs. An unauthenticated attacker can point Chromium at any internal IP — including loopback, RFC 1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints — and receive the response rendered as a PDF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, even when operators configure a custom deny-list, the protection is bypassed via HTTP redirects. Gotenberg&amp;#39;s Chromium instance follows `302` redirects from an attacker-controlled external URL to internal targets without re-validating the redirect destination against the deny-list.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What makes this particularly notable is that Gotenberg&amp;#39;s secondary features — `downloadFrom` and `webhook` — ship with default deny-lists that explicitly block RFC 1918 and link-local addresses. The primary feature, the one that literally takes a URL and fe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-chwh-f6gm-r836</guid>
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