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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 00:50:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-318579</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318579</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318579</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318579</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42592</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42592</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium&amp;#39;s actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, FilterOutboundURL resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP Fetch.requestPaused handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium&amp;#39;s actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42592</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2pmr-289p-44r3 — Gotenberg's DNS rebinding bypasses SSRF validation on Chromium URL conversion routes</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2pmr-289p-44r3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`FilterOutboundURL` resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium&amp;#39;s actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:227-230` drops the pinned IPs from the outbound decision:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func FilterOutboundURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowList, denyList []*regexp2.Regexp, deadline time.Time) error {
    _, err := decideOutbound(ctx, rawURL, allowList, denyList, deadline)
    return err
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Chromium convert path at `pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:341` calls `FilterOutboundURL(ctx, url, b.arguments.allowList, b.arguments.denyList, deadline)` and, on success, hands the raw URL string to Chromium via CDP. Chromium&amp;#39;s network stack issues its own DNS lookup for the hostname, independent of Go&amp;#39;s resolver.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` listener at `pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:55` runs a second check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
err := gotenberg.FilterOutboundURL(ctx, e.Reques…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`FilterOutboundURL` resolves the hostname, checks the resolved IPs against the private-address deny-list, and returns only the error. It discards the resolved addresses. Chromium later performs its own DNS resolution when it navigates to the URL. An attacker who controls DNS for a hostname with a short TTL returns a public IP on the first query (Gotenberg allows) and a private IP on the second query (Chromium connects to the attacker-chosen internal address). The CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` handler re-checks the URL but runs its own DNS resolution, leaving a timing window before Chromium&amp;#39;s actual TCP connect. The rendered internal service response returns to the caller as a PDF.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`pkg/gotenberg/outbound.go:227-230` drops the pinned IPs from the outbound decision:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func FilterOutboundURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, allowList, denyList []*regexp2.Regexp, deadline time.Time) error {
    _, err := decideOutbound(ctx, rawURL, allowList, denyList, deadline)
    return err
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Chromium convert path at `pkg/modules/chromium/browser.go:341` calls `FilterOutboundURL(ctx, url, b.arguments.allowList, b.arguments.denyList, deadline)` and, on success, hands the raw URL string to Chromium via CDP. Chromium&amp;#39;s network stack issues its own DNS lookup for the hostname, independent of Go&amp;#39;s resolver.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The CDP `Fetch.requestPaused` listener at `pkg/modules/chromium/events.go:55` runs a second check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
err := gotenberg.FilterOutboundURL(ctx, e.Reques…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2pmr-289p-44r3</guid>
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