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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:39:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-318592</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318592</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318592</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318592</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42555</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42555</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Valtimo is an open-source business process automation platform. com.ritense.valtimo:document from 12.0.0 to before 12.32.0, com.ritense.valtimo:case from 13.0.0 to before 13.23.0, and com.ritense.valtimo:contract from 13.4.0 to before 13.23.0 evaluate Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions from user-supplied input using StandardEvaluationContext, which provides unrestricted access to Java types and methods. An authenticated user with the ADMIN role can achieve Remote Code Execution and credential exfiltration. This vulnerability is fixed in com.ritense.valtimo:document 2.32.0, com.ritense.valtimo:case 13.23.0, and com.ritense.valtimo:contract 13.23.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Valtimo is an open-source business process automation platform. com.ritense.valtimo:document from 12.0.0 to before 12.32.0, com.ritense.valtimo:case from 13.0.0 to before 13.23.0, and com.ritense.valtimo:contract from 13.4.0 to before 13.23.0 evaluate Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions from user-supplied input using StandardEvaluationContext, which provides unrestricted access to Java types and methods. An authenticated user with the ADMIN role can achieve Remote Code Execution and credential exfiltration. This vulnerability is fixed in com.ritense.valtimo:document 2.32.0, com.ritense.valtimo:case 13.23.0, and com.ritense.valtimo:contract 13.23.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42555</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j7j9-5253-f7vh — Valtimo has SpEL injection via StandardEvaluationContext that allows Remote Code Execution by admin users</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j7j9-5253-f7vh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: com.ritense.valtimo:document, Maven: com.ritense.valtimo:case, Maven: com.ritense.valtimo:contract&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple classes evaluate Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions from user-supplied input using `StandardEvaluationContext`, which provides unrestricted access to Java types and methods. An authenticated user with the ADMIN role can achieve Remote Code Execution and credential exfiltration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with ADMIN credentials can:
- **Execute arbitrary OS commands** via `T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;)`
- **Exfiltrate all environment variables** (database passwords, API keys, Keycloak secrets) via `T(java.lang.System).getenv()`
- **Read JVM system properties** via `T(java.lang.System).getProperties()`
- **Load arbitrary classes** via `T(java.lang.Class).forName(&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;)`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. DocumentMigrationService** (since 12.0.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitable through the document migration REST API:
- `POST /api/management/v1/document-definition/migrate`
- `POST /api/management/v1/document-definition/migration/conflicts`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The malicious SpEL expression is supplied in the `source` or `target` field of a `DocumentMigrationPatch` object in the request body, using the `${...}` template syntax.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- In 12.x: `com.ritense.document.service.DocumentMigrationService#handleSpelExpression` (document module)
- In 13.x: same class, moved to the case module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Condition** (since 13.4.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitable through any admin-configured widget, dashboard, or feature that uses the `Condition` framework. The SpEL expression is supplied in the `value` field of…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: com.ritense.valtimo:document, Maven: com.ritense.valtimo:case, Maven: com.ritense.valtimo:contract&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple classes evaluate Spring Expression Language (SpEL) expressions from user-supplied input using `StandardEvaluationContext`, which provides unrestricted access to Java types and methods. An authenticated user with the ADMIN role can achieve Remote Code Execution and credential exfiltration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with ADMIN credentials can:
- **Execute arbitrary OS commands** via `T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;)`
- **Exfiltrate all environment variables** (database passwords, API keys, Keycloak secrets) via `T(java.lang.System).getenv()`
- **Read JVM system properties** via `T(java.lang.System).getProperties()`
- **Load arbitrary classes** via `T(java.lang.Class).forName(&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;)`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**1. DocumentMigrationService** (since 12.0.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitable through the document migration REST API:
- `POST /api/management/v1/document-definition/migrate`
- `POST /api/management/v1/document-definition/migration/conflicts`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The malicious SpEL expression is supplied in the `source` or `target` field of a `DocumentMigrationPatch` object in the request body, using the `${...}` template syntax.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- In 12.x: `com.ritense.document.service.DocumentMigrationService#handleSpelExpression` (document module)
- In 13.x: same class, moved to the case module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**2. Condition** (since 13.4.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitable through any admin-configured widget, dashboard, or feature that uses the `Condition` framework. The SpEL expression is supplied in the `value` field of…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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