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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-318583</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318583</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-318583</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-318583</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42349</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42349</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Clerk JavaScript is the official JavaScript repository for Clerk authentication. has(), auth.protect(), and related authorization predicates in @clerk/shared, @clerk/nextjs, @clerk/backend, and other framework SDKs can return true for certain combined authorization checks when the result should be false, allowing a gated action to proceed for a user who does not satisfy the full set of requested conditions. This call shape can be bypassed if certain conditions are met: a has() or auth.protect() call that combines a reverification check with any of role, permission, feature, or plan, or that combines a billing check (feature or plan) with a role or permission check. This vulnerability is fixed in  @clerk/clerk-js 5.125.10 and 6.7.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Clerk JavaScript is the official JavaScript repository for Clerk authentication. has(), auth.protect(), and related authorization predicates in @clerk/shared, @clerk/nextjs, @clerk/backend, and other framework SDKs can return true for certain combined authorization checks when the result should be false, allowing a gated action to proceed for a user who does not satisfy the full set of requested conditions. This call shape can be bypassed if certain conditions are met: a has() or auth.protect() call that combines a reverification check with any of role, permission, feature, or plan, or that combines a billing check (feature or plan) with a role or permission check. This vulnerability is fixed in  @clerk/clerk-js 5.125.10 and 6.7.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42349</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w24r-5266-9c3c — Clerk has an authorization bypass when combining organization, billing, or reverification checks</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w24r-5266-9c3c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @clerk/shared, npm: @clerk/backend, npm: @clerk/nextjs, npm: @clerk/clerk-js, npm: @clerk/clerk-react, npm: @clerk/react, npm: @clerk/vue, npm: @clerk/astro, npm: @clerk/nuxt, npm: @clerk/clerk-expo and 7 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`has()`, `auth.protect()`, and related authorization predicates in `@clerk/shared`, `@clerk/nextjs`, `@clerk/backend`, and other framework SDKs can return true for certain combined authorization checks when the result should be false, allowing a gated action to proceed for a user who does not satisfy the full set of requested conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sessions are not compromised and no existing user can be impersonated. The bypass is limited to the authorization decision returned by the predicate. `clerkMiddleware` continues to authenticate requests correctly, `auth()` reflects the real authentication state, and token verification is unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Who is affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All apps that combine more than one authorization dimension in a single `has()` or `auth.protect()` call should upgrade to the patched versions. Patches are drop-in with no API changes. The information below describes the scope of the bypass and helps developers understand whether their apps are potentially affected, but is not a reason to delay the upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This call shape can be bypassed if certain conditions are met: a `has()` or `auth.protect()` call that combines a `reverification` check with any of `role`, `permission`, `feature`, or `plan`, or that combines a billing check (`feature` or `plan`) with a role or permission check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// Reverification combined with role / permission / feature / plan
await auth.protect({ permission: &amp;#39;org:settings:delete&amp;#39;, reverification: &amp;#39;strict&amp;#39; });
const canAct = has(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @clerk/shared, npm: @clerk/backend, npm: @clerk/nextjs, npm: @clerk/clerk-js, npm: @clerk/clerk-react, npm: @clerk/react, npm: @clerk/vue, npm: @clerk/astro, npm: @clerk/nuxt, npm: @clerk/clerk-expo and 7 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`has()`, `auth.protect()`, and related authorization predicates in `@clerk/shared`, `@clerk/nextjs`, `@clerk/backend`, and other framework SDKs can return true for certain combined authorization checks when the result should be false, allowing a gated action to proceed for a user who does not satisfy the full set of requested conditions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sessions are not compromised and no existing user can be impersonated. The bypass is limited to the authorization decision returned by the predicate. `clerkMiddleware` continues to authenticate requests correctly, `auth()` reflects the real authentication state, and token verification is unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Who is affected&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All apps that combine more than one authorization dimension in a single `has()` or `auth.protect()` call should upgrade to the patched versions. Patches are drop-in with no API changes. The information below describes the scope of the bypass and helps developers understand whether their apps are potentially affected, but is not a reason to delay the upgrade.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This call shape can be bypassed if certain conditions are met: a `has()` or `auth.protect()` call that combines a `reverification` check with any of `role`, `permission`, `feature`, or `plan`, or that combines a billing check (`feature` or `plan`) with a role or permission check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
// Reverification combined with role / permission / feature / plan
await auth.protect({ permission: &amp;#39;org:settings:delete&amp;#39;, reverification: &amp;#39;strict&amp;#39; });
const canAct = has(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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