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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309945</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309945</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309945</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309945</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42339</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42339</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. In versions 0.11.9-alpha.1 and prior, the SSRF protection introduced in v0.9.0.5 (CVE-2025-59146) and hardened in v0.9.6 (CVE-2025-62155) does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0. A regular (non-admin) user holding any valid API token can send a multimodal request to /v1/chat/completions, /v1/responses, or /v1/messages with 0.0.0.0 as the image/file URL host, bypassing the private-IP filter and causing the server to issue HTTP requests to localhost. This constitutes at minimum a blind SSRF; when the request is routed through an AWS/Bedrock Claude adaptor, the fetched content is inlined into the model response, upgrading it to a full-read SSRF. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. In versions 0.11.9-alpha.1 and prior, the SSRF protection introduced in v0.9.0.5 (CVE-2025-59146) and hardened in v0.9.6 (CVE-2025-62155) does not block the unspecified address 0.0.0.0. A regular (non-admin) user holding any valid API token can send a multimodal request to /v1/chat/completions, /v1/responses, or /v1/messages with 0.0.0.0 as the image/file URL host, bypassing the private-IP filter and causing the server to issue HTTP requests to localhost. This constitutes at minimum a blind SSRF; when the request is routed through an AWS/Bedrock Claude adaptor, the fetched content is inlined into the model response, upgrading it to a full-read SSRF. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v5c3-6wvc-pc2q — QuantumNous/new-api has an SSRF Filter Bypass via 0.0.0.0</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v5c3-6wvc-pc2q</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# SSRF Filter Bypass via `0.0.0.0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSRF protection introduced in v0.9.0.5 (CVE-2025-59146) and hardened in v0.9.6 (CVE-2025-62155) does not block the unspecified address `0.0.0.0`. A regular (non-admin) user holding any valid API token can send a multimodal request to `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/responses`, or `/v1/messages` with `0.0.0.0` as the image/file URL host, bypassing the private-IP filter and causing the server to issue HTTP requests to localhost. This constitutes at minimum a **blind SSRF**; when the request is routed through an AWS/Bedrock Claude adaptor, the fetched content is inlined into the model response, upgrading it to a **full-read SSRF**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`common/ssrf_protection.go` — `isPrivateIP()` (lines 33–47) checks the following ranges:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `10.0.0.0/8`
- `172.16.0.0/12`
- `192.168.0.0/16`
- `127.0.0.0/8`
- `169.254.0.0/16`
- `224.0.0.0/4`
- `240.0.0.0/4`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`0.0.0.0/8` is not checked.** On Linux, `0.0.0.0` resolves to the local machine, same as `127.0.0.1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Default Fetch Settings&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`setting/system_setting/fetch_setting.go` (lines 16–24) defaults:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `EnableSSRFProtection: true`
- `AllowPrivateIp: false`
- `AllowedPorts: [&amp;#34;80&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;443&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;8080&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;8443&amp;#34;]`
- `ApplyIPFilterForDomain: true`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So `0.0.0.0` on any of these four ports passes all checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Data Flow (primary chain — `/v1/chat/completions`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
User API token
→ /v1/chat/completions  (TokenAuth, no admin required)
→ messages[].content[].image_url.url =…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/QuantumNous/new-api&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# SSRF Filter Bypass via `0.0.0.0`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SSRF protection introduced in v0.9.0.5 (CVE-2025-59146) and hardened in v0.9.6 (CVE-2025-62155) does not block the unspecified address `0.0.0.0`. A regular (non-admin) user holding any valid API token can send a multimodal request to `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/responses`, or `/v1/messages` with `0.0.0.0` as the image/file URL host, bypassing the private-IP filter and causing the server to issue HTTP requests to localhost. This constitutes at minimum a **blind SSRF**; when the request is routed through an AWS/Bedrock Claude adaptor, the fetched content is inlined into the model response, upgrading it to a **full-read SSRF**.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`common/ssrf_protection.go` — `isPrivateIP()` (lines 33–47) checks the following ranges:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `10.0.0.0/8`
- `172.16.0.0/12`
- `192.168.0.0/16`
- `127.0.0.0/8`
- `169.254.0.0/16`
- `224.0.0.0/4`
- `240.0.0.0/4`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**`0.0.0.0/8` is not checked.** On Linux, `0.0.0.0` resolves to the local machine, same as `127.0.0.1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Default Fetch Settings&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`setting/system_setting/fetch_setting.go` (lines 16–24) defaults:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `EnableSSRFProtection: true`
- `AllowPrivateIp: false`
- `AllowedPorts: [&amp;#34;80&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;443&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;8080&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;8443&amp;#34;]`
- `ApplyIPFilterForDomain: true`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So `0.0.0.0` on any of these four ports passes all checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Data Flow (primary chain — `/v1/chat/completions`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
User API token
→ /v1/chat/completions  (TokenAuth, no admin required)
→ messages[].content[].image_url.url =…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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