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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309284</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309284</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309284</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309284</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42259</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42259</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Saltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, and 1.6.0-beta.5, Saltcorn validates the post-login dest parameter with a string check that only blocks :/ and //. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (\) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as /\evil.com/path slips through is_relative_url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTP Location header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, and 1.6.0-beta.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Saltcorn is an extensible, open source, no-code database application builder. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, and 1.6.0-beta.5, Saltcorn validates the post-login dest parameter with a string check that only blocks :/ and //. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (\) to forward slashes (/) for special schemes, a payload such as /\evil.com/path slips through is_relative_url(), is emitted unchanged in the HTTP Location header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.6, and 1.6.0-beta.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42259</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f3g8-9xv5-77gv — Saltcorn: Open Redirect in `POST /auth/login` due to incomplete `is_relative_url` validation (backslash bypass)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f3g8-9xv5-77gv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @saltcorn/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Saltcorn validates the post-login `dest` parameter with a string check that only blocks `:/` and `//`. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (`\`) to forward slashes (`/`) for special schemes, a payload such as `/\evil.com/path` slips through `is_relative_url()`, is emitted unchanged in the HTTP `Location` header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Vulnerable function: `packages/server/routes/utils.js:393-395`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const is_relative_url = (url) =&amp;gt; {
  return typeof url === &amp;#34;string&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !url.includes(&amp;#34;:/&amp;#34;) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !url.includes(&amp;#34;//&amp;#34;);
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function&amp;#39;s intent is to allow only same-origin redirects, but the allow-list only checks for two literal substrings. It does not handle:
- backslash characters, which WHATWG URL parsing (used by every modern browser) treats as forward slashes for the special schemes `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `ws`, `wss`. A URL parser fed `/\evil.com/path` with a base of `http://victim/` resolves to `http://evil.com/path`.
- non-`http(s):` schemes that do not contain `:/`. The strings `javascript:alert(1)`, `data:text/html,...`, `vbscript:...` all pass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable callsite: `packages/server/auth/routes.js:1371-1376`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
} else if (
  (req.body || {}).dest &amp;amp;&amp;amp;
  is_relative_url(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest))
) {
  res.red…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @saltcorn/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Saltcorn validates the post-login `dest` parameter with a string check that only blocks `:/` and `//`. Because all WHATWG-compliant browsers normalise backslashes (`\`) to forward slashes (`/`) for special schemes, a payload such as `/\evil.com/path` slips through `is_relative_url()`, is emitted unchanged in the HTTP `Location` header, and causes the browser to navigate cross-origin to an attacker-controlled domain. The bug is reachable on a default install and only requires a victim who can be tricked into logging in via a crafted Saltcorn URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
Vulnerable function: `packages/server/routes/utils.js:393-395`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const is_relative_url = (url) =&amp;gt; {
  return typeof url === &amp;#34;string&amp;#34; &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !url.includes(&amp;#34;:/&amp;#34;) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; !url.includes(&amp;#34;//&amp;#34;);
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The function&amp;#39;s intent is to allow only same-origin redirects, but the allow-list only checks for two literal substrings. It does not handle:
- backslash characters, which WHATWG URL parsing (used by every modern browser) treats as forward slashes for the special schemes `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `ws`, `wss`. A URL parser fed `/\evil.com/path` with a base of `http://victim/` resolves to `http://evil.com/path`.
- non-`http(s):` schemes that do not contain `:/`. The strings `javascript:alert(1)`, `data:text/html,...`, `vbscript:...` all pass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable callsite: `packages/server/auth/routes.js:1371-1376`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
} else if (
  (req.body || {}).dest &amp;amp;&amp;amp;
  is_relative_url(decodeURIComponent((req.body || {}).dest))
) {
  res.red…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f3g8-9xv5-77gv</guid>
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