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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-317420</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317420</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-317420</description>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42213</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42213</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE is an unofficial, independently developed extension, Postprocessor IDE for SolidCAM. From version 1.0.0 to before version 1.0.2, the inc &amp;#34;filename&amp;#34; directive in GPPL postprocessor files is resolved by GpplDocumentLinkHandler into a clickable link (VS Code textDocument/documentLink). The handler accepted arbitrary paths — absolute, relative with parent-directory segments (..\..\..\), UNC (\\server\share\), and arbitrary subfolders — and called File.Exists on each to decide whether to render the link. Two distinct attack surfaces resulted: information disclosure via File.Exists probing and NTLM hash leak via UNC path probing. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SolidCAM-GPPL-IDE is an unofficial, independently developed extension, Postprocessor IDE for SolidCAM. From version 1.0.0 to before version 1.0.2, the inc &amp;#34;filename&amp;#34; directive in GPPL postprocessor files is resolved by GpplDocumentLinkHandler into a clickable link (VS Code textDocument/documentLink). The handler accepted arbitrary paths — absolute, relative with parent-directory segments (..\..\..\), UNC (\\server\share\), and arbitrary subfolders — and called File.Exists on each to decide whether to render the link. Two distinct attack surfaces resulted: information disclosure via File.Exists probing and NTLM hash leak via UNC path probing. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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