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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 15:06:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-317993</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317993</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-317993</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317993</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42191</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42191</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol is the OTLP (OpenTelemetry Protocol) exporter implementation. From 1.8.0 to 1.15.2, the OTLP disk retry feature in OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol silently fell back to Path.GetTempPath() when OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk was set but OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH was not configured. The exporter stored and loaded *.blob files under fixed, signal-named subdirectories (traces, metrics, logs) beneath that shared temporary root path. On multi-user systems where the temporary directory is accessible to other local accounts, this allows an attacker to write crafted *.blob files, read *.blob files written by the application between export failures, or deposit numerous or oversized blob files, degrading retry-loop performance or consuming disk space. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.15.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol is the OTLP (OpenTelemetry Protocol) exporter implementation. From 1.8.0 to 1.15.2, the OTLP disk retry feature in OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol silently fell back to Path.GetTempPath() when OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk was set but OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH was not configured. The exporter stored and loaded *.blob files under fixed, signal-named subdirectories (traces, metrics, logs) beneath that shared temporary root path. On multi-user systems where the temporary directory is accessible to other local accounts, this allows an attacker to write crafted *.blob files, read *.blob files written by the application between export failures, or deposit numerous or oversized blob files, degrading retry-loop performance or consuming disk space. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.15.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42191</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4625-4j76-fww9 — OpenTelemetry's disk retry default temp path enables local blob injection via OTLP Exporter</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4625-4j76-fww9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OTLP disk retry feature in `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol` silently fell back to `Path.GetTempPath()` when `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk` was set but `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` was not configured.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exporter stored and loaded `*.blob` files under fixed, signal-named subdirectories (`traces`, `metrics`, `logs`) beneath that shared temporary root path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On multi-user systems where the temporary directory is accessible to other local accounts, this exposed three attack surfaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Blob injection (integrity):** an attacker could write crafted `*.blob` files into the predictable path; the exporter picks them up on the next retry cycle and forwards them to the configured OTLP endpoint under the application&amp;#39;s identity.
- **Telemetry disclosure (confidentiality):** an attacker reads `*.blob` files written by the application between export failures, recovering encoded telemetry payloads (spans, metric data points, log records).
- **Resource exhaustion (availability):** an attacker deposits numerous or oversized blob files, degrading retry-loop performance or consuming disk space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY` is set to `disk`.
2. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` is not set, causing the exporter to resolve the blob storage root using the `System.IO.Path.GetTempPath()` API.
3. A local attacker has read or write access to the process&amp;#39; tem…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NuGet: OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OTLP disk retry feature in `OpenTelemetry.Exporter.OpenTelemetryProtocol` silently fell back to `Path.GetTempPath()` when `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY=disk` was set but `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` was not configured.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exporter stored and loaded `*.blob` files under fixed, signal-named subdirectories (`traces`, `metrics`, `logs`) beneath that shared temporary root path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On multi-user systems where the temporary directory is accessible to other local accounts, this exposed three attack surfaces:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Blob injection (integrity):** an attacker could write crafted `*.blob` files into the predictable path; the exporter picks them up on the next retry cycle and forwards them to the configured OTLP endpoint under the application&amp;#39;s identity.
- **Telemetry disclosure (confidentiality):** an attacker reads `*.blob` files written by the application between export failures, recovering encoded telemetry payloads (spans, metric data points, log records).
- **Resource exhaustion (availability):** an attacker deposits numerous or oversized blob files, degrading retry-loop performance or consuming disk space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Preconditions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_RETRY` is set to `disk`.
2. `OTEL_DOTNET_EXPERIMENTAL_OTLP_DISK_RETRY_DIRECTORY_PATH` is not set, causing the exporter to resolve the blob storage root using the `System.IO.Path.GetTempPath()` API.
3. A local attacker has read or write access to the process&amp;#39; tem…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4625-4j76-fww9</guid>
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