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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309876</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309876</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309876</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309876</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42189</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42189</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Prior to version 0.60.1, a pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server&amp;#39;s keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials. This issue has been patched in version 0.60.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Russh is a Rust SSH client &amp;amp; server library. Prior to version 0.60.1, a pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server&amp;#39;s keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials. This issue has been patched in version 0.60.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42189</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f5v4-2wr6-hqmg — russh has pre-auth DoS via unbounded allocation in its keyboard-interactive auth handler</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f5v4-2wr6-hqmg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server&amp;#39;s keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`, the function `read_userauth_info_response` decodes a `u32` count from the client&amp;#39;s `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE` and passes it directly to `Vec::with_capacity()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let n = map_err!(u32::decode(r))?;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Bound both allocation and iteration by remaining packet data to
// prevent a malicious client from causing a multi-GB allocation or
// billions of loop iterations with a crafted count.
// Each response needs at least 4 bytes (length prefix).
let max_responses = r.remaining_len().saturating_add(3) / 4;
let n = (n as usize).min(max_responses);
let mut responses = Vec::with_capacity(n);
for _ in 0..n {
    responses.push(Bytes::decode(r).ok())
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can send `n = 0x10000000` (268M) or larger in a minimal packet (~50 bytes after encryption). The server attempts to allocate `n * ~24 bytes` (size of `Option&amp;lt;Bytes&amp;gt;`) = ~6.4GB, causing an OOM crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker connects via TCP, completes key exchange (no credentials needed -- this is the anonymous DH handshake, not authentication)
2. Sends `USERAUTH_REQUEST` with method `keyboard-interactive`
3. Server handler returns `Auth::Parti…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A pre-authentication denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the server&amp;#39;s keyboard-interactive authentication handler. A malicious client can crash any russh-based server that implements keyboard-interactive auth (e.g., for 2FA/TOTP) with a single malformed packet, requiring no credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `russh/src/server/encrypted.rs`, the function `read_userauth_info_response` decodes a `u32` count from the client&amp;#39;s `SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE` and passes it directly to `Vec::with_capacity()`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let n = map_err!(u32::decode(r))?;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Bound both allocation and iteration by remaining packet data to
// prevent a malicious client from causing a multi-GB allocation or
// billions of loop iterations with a crafted count.
// Each response needs at least 4 bytes (length prefix).
let max_responses = r.remaining_len().saturating_add(3) / 4;
let n = (n as usize).min(max_responses);
let mut responses = Vec::with_capacity(n);
for _ in 0..n {
    responses.push(Bytes::decode(r).ok())
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker can send `n = 0x10000000` (268M) or larger in a minimal packet (~50 bytes after encryption). The server attempts to allocate `n * ~24 bytes` (size of `Option&amp;lt;Bytes&amp;gt;`) = ~6.4GB, causing an OOM crash.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Flow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker connects via TCP, completes key exchange (no credentials needed -- this is the anonymous DH handshake, not authentication)
2. Sends `USERAUTH_REQUEST` with method `keyboard-interactive`
3. Server handler returns `Auth::Parti…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f5v4-2wr6-hqmg</guid>
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