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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309950</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309950</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309950</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309950</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42181</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42181</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to version 0.19.18, Lemmy fetches metadata for user-supplied post URLs and, under the default StoreLinkPreviews image mode, downloads the preview image through local pict-rs. While the top-level page URL is checked against internal IP ranges, the extracted og:image URL is not subject to the same restriction. As a result, an authenticated low-privileged user can submit an attacker-controlled public page whose Open Graph image points to an internal image endpoint. Lemmy will fetch that internal image server-side and store a local thumbnail that can then be served back to users. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.18.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Lemmy is a link aggregator and forum for the fediverse. Prior to version 0.19.18, Lemmy fetches metadata for user-supplied post URLs and, under the default StoreLinkPreviews image mode, downloads the preview image through local pict-rs. While the top-level page URL is checked against internal IP ranges, the extracted og:image URL is not subject to the same restriction. As a result, an authenticated low-privileged user can submit an attacker-controlled public page whose Open Graph image points to an internal image endpoint. Lemmy will fetch that internal image server-side and store a local thumbnail that can then be served back to users. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.18.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42181</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h6hf-9846-xwrq — Lemmy has SSRF and internal image disclosure in post link metadata via unvalidated og:image</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h6hf-9846-xwrq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: lemmy_api_common&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Lemmy fetches metadata for user-supplied post URLs and, under the default `StoreLinkPreviews` image mode, downloads the preview image through local pict-rs. While the top-level page URL is checked against internal IP ranges, the extracted `og:image` URL is not subject to the same restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an authenticated low-privileged user can submit an attacker-controlled public page whose Open Graph image points to an internal image endpoint. Lemmy will fetch that internal image server-side and store a local thumbnail that can then be served back to users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The metadata fetch logic applies an internal-address check only to the initial post URL. After HTML parsing, `extract_opengraph_data()` accepts absolute `og:image` values and returns them as-is. Later, `generate_post_link_metadata()` passes that second-hop image URL into `generate_pictrs_thumbnail()`, which instructs local pict-rs to fetch it through `image/download?url=...`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates a two-stage source-to-sink chain where the first URL is constrained, but the security boundary is bypassed through an unvalidated secondary resource.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Core vulnerable code path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
// crates/api_common/src/request.rs
let metadata = match &amp;amp;post.url {
  Some(url) =&amp;gt; fetch_link_metadata(url, &amp;amp;context, false).await.unwrap_or_default(),
  _ =&amp;gt; Default::default(),
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
// crates/api_common/src/request.rs
let og_image = page
  .opengraph
  .images
  .first()
  .and_then(|ogo| url.join(&amp;amp;ogo.url).ok(…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: lemmy_api_common&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Lemmy fetches metadata for user-supplied post URLs and, under the default `StoreLinkPreviews` image mode, downloads the preview image through local pict-rs. While the top-level page URL is checked against internal IP ranges, the extracted `og:image` URL is not subject to the same restriction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a result, an authenticated low-privileged user can submit an attacker-controlled public page whose Open Graph image points to an internal image endpoint. Lemmy will fetch that internal image server-side and store a local thumbnail that can then be served back to users.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The metadata fetch logic applies an internal-address check only to the initial post URL. After HTML parsing, `extract_opengraph_data()` accepts absolute `og:image` values and returns them as-is. Later, `generate_post_link_metadata()` passes that second-hop image URL into `generate_pictrs_thumbnail()`, which instructs local pict-rs to fetch it through `image/download?url=...`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This creates a two-stage source-to-sink chain where the first URL is constrained, but the security boundary is bypassed through an unvalidated secondary resource.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Core vulnerable code path:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
// crates/api_common/src/request.rs
let metadata = match &amp;amp;post.url {
  Some(url) =&amp;gt; fetch_link_metadata(url, &amp;amp;context, false).await.unwrap_or_default(),
  _ =&amp;gt; Default::default(),
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
// crates/api_common/src/request.rs
let og_image = page
  .opengraph
  .images
  .first()
  .and_then(|ogo| url.join(&amp;amp;ogo.url).ok(…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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