<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 20:38:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-308519</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308519</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-308519</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-308519</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42090</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42090</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Notesnook is a note-taking app focused on user privacy &amp;amp; ease of use. Prior to Notesnook Web/Desktop version 3.3.15 and prior to Notesnook iOS/Android version 3.3.20, a stored XSS vulnerability in the note export flow can be escalated to remote code execution in the desktop app. The root cause is that exported note fields such as title, headline, and content are inserted into the generated HTML template without HTML escaping. When the note is later exported to PDF, Notesnook renders that HTML into a same-origin, unsandboxed iframe using iframe.srcdoc = .... Injected script executes in the Notesnook origin. In the desktop app, this becomes RCE because Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false. This issue has been patched in Notesnook Web/Desktop version 3.3.15 and Notesnook iOS/Android version 3.3.20.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Notesnook is a note-taking app focused on user privacy &amp;amp; ease of use. Prior to Notesnook Web/Desktop version 3.3.15 and prior to Notesnook iOS/Android version 3.3.20, a stored XSS vulnerability in the note export flow can be escalated to remote code execution in the desktop app. The root cause is that exported note fields such as title, headline, and content are inserted into the generated HTML template without HTML escaping. When the note is later exported to PDF, Notesnook renders that HTML into a same-origin, unsandboxed iframe using iframe.srcdoc = .... Injected script executes in the Notesnook origin. In the desktop app, this becomes RCE because Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false. This issue has been patched in Notesnook Web/Desktop version 3.3.15 and Notesnook iOS/Android version 3.3.20.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42090</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
