https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 08:26:28 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1165 certfr-2026-avi-1165 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1165 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309129 EUVD-2026-309129 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309129 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41691 <p>Copilot said: i18nextify is a JavaScript library that adds i18nextify is a JavaScript library that adds website internationalization via a script tag, without source code changes. Versions prior to 3.0.5 interpolate the lng and ns values directly into the configured loadPath / addPath URL template without any encoding, validation, or path sanitisation. When an application exposes the language-code selection to user-controlled input (the default — i18next-browser-languagedetector reads ?lng= query params, cookies, localStorage, and request headers), an attacker can inject characters that change the structure of the outgoing request URL. This is a single URL-injection vulnerability. The attacker-controlled value is neutralised before it is used as part of an output URL string; the attack shape covers both path traversal and broader URL-structure injection — both are closed by the one interpolateUrl sanitisation fix. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5. If users cannot upgrade immediately, they can work around the issue by sanitising lng / ns before they reach i18next (strip .., /, \, ?, #, %, whitespace, and control characters; cap the length).</p> <p>Copilot said: i18nextify is a JavaScript library that adds i18nextify is a JavaScript library that adds website internationalization via a script tag, without source code changes. Versions prior to 3.0.5 interpolate the lng and ns values directly into the configured loadPath / addPath URL template without any encoding, validation, or path sanitisation. When an application exposes the language-code selection to user-controlled input (the default — i18next-browser-languagedetector reads ?lng= query params, cookies, localStorage, and request headers), an attacker can inject characters that change the structure of the outgoing request URL. This is a single URL-injection vulnerability. The attacker-controlled value is neutralised before it is used as part of an output URL string; the attack shape covers both path traversal and broader URL-structure injection — both are closed by the one interpolateUrl sanitisation fix. This issue has been fixed in version 3.0.5. If users cannot upgrade immediately, they can work around the issue by sanitising lng / ns before they reach i18next (strip .., /, \, ?, #, %, whitespace, and control characters; cap the length).</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41691 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q89c-q3h5-w34g <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: i18next-http-backend</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Versions of `i18next-http-backend` prior to 3.0.5 interpolate the `lng` and `ns` values directly into the configured `loadPath` / `addPath` URL template without any encoding, validation, or path sanitisation. When an application exposes the language-code selection to user-controlled input (the default — `i18next-browser-languagedetector` reads `?lng=` query params, cookies, `localStorage`, and request headers), an attacker can inject characters that change the structure of the outgoing request URL.</p> <p>Affected call sites:</p> <p>- `_readAny` — `lib/index.js:64`: `interpolate(resolvedLoadPath, { lng: languages.join(&#39;+&#39;), ns: namespaces.join(&#39;+&#39;) })` - `create` — `lib/index.js:123` (pre-patch): `interpolate(addPath, { lng, ns: namespace })`</p> <p>The helper `interpolate` (`lib/utils.js`) previously returned the raw value with no encoding. In contrast, `addQueryString` already correctly uses `encodeURIComponent` for each query-string param — only the URL-path substitution was unprotected.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who can influence the resolved `lng` or `ns` value can alter the URL in several ways:</p> <p>- **Path traversal** — `lng = &#39;../../config&#39;` turns `/locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json` into `/locales/../../config/translation.json`. On a misconfigured web server, this can cause the request to target a different resource than intended; in SSR pipelines that use `file://` or similar schemes for `loadPath`, it can read arbitrary files from the host filesystem. - **Query-string injection*…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: i18next-http-backend</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>Versions of `i18next-http-backend` prior to 3.0.5 interpolate the `lng` and `ns` values directly into the configured `loadPath` / `addPath` URL template without any encoding, validation, or path sanitisation. When an application exposes the language-code selection to user-controlled input (the default — `i18next-browser-languagedetector` reads `?lng=` query params, cookies, `localStorage`, and request headers), an attacker can inject characters that change the structure of the outgoing request URL.</p> <p>Affected call sites:</p> <p>- `_readAny` — `lib/index.js:64`: `interpolate(resolvedLoadPath, { lng: languages.join(&#39;+&#39;), ns: namespaces.join(&#39;+&#39;) })` - `create` — `lib/index.js:123` (pre-patch): `interpolate(addPath, { lng, ns: namespace })`</p> <p>The helper `interpolate` (`lib/utils.js`) previously returned the raw value with no encoding. In contrast, `addQueryString` already correctly uses `encodeURIComponent` for each query-string param — only the URL-path substitution was unprotected.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker who can influence the resolved `lng` or `ns` value can alter the URL in several ways:</p> <p>- **Path traversal** — `lng = &#39;../../config&#39;` turns `/locales/{{lng}}/{{ns}}.json` into `/locales/../../config/translation.json`. On a misconfigured web server, this can cause the request to target a different resource than intended; in SSR pipelines that use `file://` or similar schemes for `loadPath`, it can read arbitrary files from the host filesystem. - **Query-string injection*…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q89c-q3h5-w34g