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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309010</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309010</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309010</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309010</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41656</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41656</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the add mode in modules/documents-files.php accepts a name parameter validated only as &amp;#39;string&amp;#39; type (HTML encoding), allowing path traversal characters (../) to pass through unfiltered. Combined with the absence of CSRF protection on this endpoint and SameSite=Lax session cookies, a low-privileged attacker can trick a documents administrator into clicking a crafted link that registers an arbitrary server file (e.g., install/config.php containing database credentials) into a documents folder accessible to the attacker. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.9, the add mode in modules/documents-files.php accepts a name parameter validated only as &amp;#39;string&amp;#39; type (HTML encoding), allowing path traversal characters (../) to pass through unfiltered. Combined with the absence of CSRF protection on this endpoint and SameSite=Lax session cookies, a low-privileged attacker can trick a documents administrator into clicking a crafted link that registers an arbitrary server file (e.g., install/config.php containing database credentials) into a documents folder accessible to the attacker. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.9.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41656</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m9h6-8pqm-xrhf — Admidio has Path Traversal via Unvalidated `name` Parameter in Document Add Mode that Enables Arbitrary Server File Read</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m9h6-8pqm-xrhf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `add` mode in `modules/documents-files.php` accepts a `name` parameter validated only as `&amp;#39;string&amp;#39;` type (HTML encoding), allowing path traversal characters (`../`) to pass through unfiltered. Combined with the absence of CSRF protection on this endpoint and `SameSite=Lax` session cookies, a low-privileged attacker can trick a documents administrator into clicking a crafted link that registers an arbitrary server file (e.g., `install/config.php` containing database credentials) into a documents folder accessible to the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause — incorrect input validation type (modules/documents-files.php:222):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
case &amp;#39;add&amp;#39;:
    $getName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, &amp;#39;name&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;string&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `&amp;#39;string&amp;#39;` type in `admFuncVariableIsValid()` only applies `SecurityUtils::encodeHTML(StringUtils::strStripTags($value))` (system/bootstrap/function.php:414-416). Since `../` contains no HTML special characters (`&amp;lt;`, `&amp;gt;`, `&amp;amp;`, `&amp;#34;`, `&amp;#39;`), path traversal sequences pass through unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct type would be `&amp;#39;file&amp;#39;`, which calls `StringUtils::strIsValidFileName()` (src/Infrastructure/Utils/StringUtils.php:217-236). This function checks `basename($filename) !== $filename` at line 228, which would reject any path containing directory separators.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Missing CSRF protection (modules/documents-files.php:221-238):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
case &amp;#39;add&amp;#39;:
    $getName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, &amp;#39;name&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;string&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (!$gCurrentUser-&amp;gt;isAdministratorDocumentsFi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `add` mode in `modules/documents-files.php` accepts a `name` parameter validated only as `&amp;#39;string&amp;#39;` type (HTML encoding), allowing path traversal characters (`../`) to pass through unfiltered. Combined with the absence of CSRF protection on this endpoint and `SameSite=Lax` session cookies, a low-privileged attacker can trick a documents administrator into clicking a crafted link that registers an arbitrary server file (e.g., `install/config.php` containing database credentials) into a documents folder accessible to the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause — incorrect input validation type (modules/documents-files.php:222):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
case &amp;#39;add&amp;#39;:
    $getName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, &amp;#39;name&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;string&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `&amp;#39;string&amp;#39;` type in `admFuncVariableIsValid()` only applies `SecurityUtils::encodeHTML(StringUtils::strStripTags($value))` (system/bootstrap/function.php:414-416). Since `../` contains no HTML special characters (`&amp;lt;`, `&amp;gt;`, `&amp;amp;`, `&amp;#34;`, `&amp;#39;`), path traversal sequences pass through unchanged.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The correct type would be `&amp;#39;file&amp;#39;`, which calls `StringUtils::strIsValidFileName()` (src/Infrastructure/Utils/StringUtils.php:217-236). This function checks `basename($filename) !== $filename` at line 228, which would reject any path containing directory separators.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Missing CSRF protection (modules/documents-files.php:221-238):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
case &amp;#39;add&amp;#39;:
    $getName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_GET, &amp;#39;name&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;string&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if (!$gCurrentUser-&amp;gt;isAdministratorDocumentsFi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m9h6-8pqm-xrhf</guid>
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