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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:30:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-309182</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309182</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-309182</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-309182</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41570</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41570</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. In versions 12.5.21 and 13.1.5, PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP&amp;#39;s INI parser interprets &amp;#34; as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives. An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child&amp;#39;s configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process. This issue has been patched in versions 12.5.22 and 13.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. In versions 12.5.21 and 13.1.5, PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP&amp;#39;s INI parser interprets &amp;#34; as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives. An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child&amp;#39;s configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process. This issue has been patched in versions 12.5.22 and 13.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41570</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243 — PHPUnit has Argument injection via newline in PHP INI values that are forwarded to child processes</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qrr6-mg7r-m243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpunit/phpunit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as `-d name=value` command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP&amp;#39;s INI parser interprets `&amp;#34;` as a string delimiter, `;` as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child&amp;#39;s configuration, including `auto_prepend_file`, `extension`, `disable_functions`, `open_basedir`, and others. Setting `auto_prepend_file` to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sources of INI values that participate in the attack:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `&amp;lt;ini name=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34; value=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34;/&amp;gt;` entries in `phpunit.xml` / `phpunit.xml.dist`
- INI settings inherited from the host PHP runtime via `ini_get_all()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Threat Model&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires the attacker to control the content of an INI value read by PHPUnit. In practice this means write access to the project&amp;#39;s `phpunit.xml`, the host `php.ini`, or the PHP binary&amp;#39;s environment. The most realistic exposure is [Poisoned Pipeline Execution](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/CICD-SEC-04-Poisoned-Pipeline-Execution) (PPE): a pull request from an untrusted contributor that modifies `phpunit.xml` to include a newline-containing INI value, executed by a CI s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: phpunit/phpunit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as `-d name=value` command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP&amp;#39;s INI parser interprets `&amp;#34;` as a string delimiter, `;` as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child&amp;#39;s configuration, including `auto_prepend_file`, `extension`, `disable_functions`, `open_basedir`, and others. Setting `auto_prepend_file` to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sources of INI values that participate in the attack:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `&amp;lt;ini name=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34; value=&amp;#34;…&amp;#34;/&amp;gt;` entries in `phpunit.xml` / `phpunit.xml.dist`
- INI settings inherited from the host PHP runtime via `ini_get_all()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Threat Model&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exploitation requires the attacker to control the content of an INI value read by PHPUnit. In practice this means write access to the project&amp;#39;s `phpunit.xml`, the host `php.ini`, or the PHP binary&amp;#39;s environment. The most realistic exposure is [Poisoned Pipeline Execution](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/CICD-SEC-04-Poisoned-Pipeline-Execution) (PPE): a pull request from an untrusted contributor that modifies `phpunit.xml` to include a newline-containing INI value, executed by a CI s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qrr6-mg7r-m243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-41570</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-41570</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:25.10: phpunit, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: phpunit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. In versions 12.5.21 and 13.1.5, PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP&amp;#39;s INI parser interprets &amp;#34; as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives. An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child&amp;#39;s configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process. This issue has been patched in versions 12.5.22 and 13.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: phpunit, Ubuntu:25.10: phpunit, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: phpunit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PHPUnit is a testing framework for PHP. In versions 12.5.21 and 13.1.5, PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP&amp;#39;s INI parser interprets &amp;#34; as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives. An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child&amp;#39;s configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process. This issue has been patched in versions 12.5.22 and 13.1.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-41570</guid>
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