<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 13:22:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292962</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292962</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292962</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292962</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41321</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;@astrojs/cloudflare is an SSR adapter for use with Cloudflare Workers targets. Prior to 13.1.10, the fetch() call for remote images in packages/integrations/cloudflare/src/utils/image-binding-transform.ts uses the default redirect: &amp;#39;follow&amp;#39; behavior. This allows the Cloudflare Worker to follow HTTP redirects to arbitrary URLs, bypassing the isRemoteAllowed() domain allowlist check which only validates the initial URL. This vulnerabiity is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-58179. This vulnerability is fixed in 13.1.10.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;@astrojs/cloudflare is an SSR adapter for use with Cloudflare Workers targets. Prior to 13.1.10, the fetch() call for remote images in packages/integrations/cloudflare/src/utils/image-binding-transform.ts uses the default redirect: &amp;#39;follow&amp;#39; behavior. This allows the Cloudflare Worker to follow HTTP redirects to arbitrary URLs, bypassing the isRemoteAllowed() domain allowlist check which only validates the initial URL. This vulnerabiity is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-58179. This vulnerability is fixed in 13.1.10.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41321</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-88gm-j2wx-58h6 — Cloudflare has SSRF via redirect following through its image-binding-transform endpoint (incomplete fix for GHSA-qpr4)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88gm-j2wx-58h6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @astrojs/cloudflare&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `fetch()` call for remote images in `packages/integrations/cloudflare/src/utils/image-binding-transform.ts` (line 28) uses the default `redirect: &amp;#39;follow&amp;#39;` behavior. This allows the Cloudflare Worker to follow HTTP redirects to arbitrary URLs, bypassing the `isRemoteAllowed()` domain allowlist check which only validates the initial URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All three other image fetch paths in the codebase correctly use `{ redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; }`. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-qpr4-c339-7vq8.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed on HEAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`image-binding-transform.ts` line 28:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const content = await (isRemotePath(href) ? fetch(imageSrc) : assets.fetch(imageSrc));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Missing `{ redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; }`. The three protected paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// image-passthrough-endpoint.ts:23
    response = await fetch(href, { redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; });&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// assets/endpoint/shared.ts:11
    const res = await fetch(src, { redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; });&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// assets/utils/remoteProbe.ts:53
    const response = await fetch(url, { redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; });&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Demonstrated with Node.js that `fetch()` without `redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39;` follows 302 redirects to arbitrary destinations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Server A (allowed domain) returns 302 → Server B (internal)
    fetch(&amp;#39;http://allowed:19741/img.jpg&amp;#39;)                        → follows 302 → hits http://internal:19742/secret
    fetch(&amp;#39;http://allowed:19741/img.jpg&amp;#39;, {redirect:&amp;#39;manual&amp;#39;})   → returns 302, internal server NOT hit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attack path: attacker finds an open redirect on an allowed doma…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @astrojs/cloudflare&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `fetch()` call for remote images in `packages/integrations/cloudflare/src/utils/image-binding-transform.ts` (line 28) uses the default `redirect: &amp;#39;follow&amp;#39;` behavior. This allows the Cloudflare Worker to follow HTTP redirects to arbitrary URLs, bypassing the `isRemoteAllowed()` domain allowlist check which only validates the initial URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All three other image fetch paths in the codebase correctly use `{ redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; }`. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-qpr4-c339-7vq8.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confirmed on HEAD.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`image-binding-transform.ts` line 28:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const content = await (isRemotePath(href) ? fetch(imageSrc) : assets.fetch(imageSrc));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Missing `{ redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; }`. The three protected paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// image-passthrough-endpoint.ts:23
    response = await fetch(href, { redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; });&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// assets/endpoint/shared.ts:11
    const res = await fetch(src, { redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; });&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// assets/utils/remoteProbe.ts:53
    const response = await fetch(url, { redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39; });&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Demonstrated with Node.js that `fetch()` without `redirect: &amp;#39;manual&amp;#39;` follows 302 redirects to arbitrary destinations:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Server A (allowed domain) returns 302 → Server B (internal)
    fetch(&amp;#39;http://allowed:19741/img.jpg&amp;#39;)                        → follows 302 → hits http://internal:19742/secret
    fetch(&amp;#39;http://allowed:19741/img.jpg&amp;#39;, {redirect:&amp;#39;manual&amp;#39;})   → returns 302, internal server NOT hit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attack path: attacker finds an open redirect on an allowed doma…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-88gm-j2wx-58h6</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
