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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292353</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292353</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292353</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292353</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-4128</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-4128</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The TP Restore Categories And Taxonomies plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. The delete_term() function, which handles the &amp;#39;tpmcattt_delete_term&amp;#39; AJAX action, does not perform any capability check (e.g., current_user_can()) to verify the user has sufficient permissions. While it does verify a nonce via check_ajax_referer(), this nonce is generated for all authenticated users via the admin_enqueue_scripts hook and exposed on any wp-admin page (including profile.php, which subscribers can access). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to permanently delete taxonomy term records from the plugin&amp;#39;s trash/backup tables by sending a crafted AJAX request with a valid nonce and an arbitrary term_id.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The TP Restore Categories And Taxonomies plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. The delete_term() function, which handles the &amp;#39;tpmcattt_delete_term&amp;#39; AJAX action, does not perform any capability check (e.g., current_user_can()) to verify the user has sufficient permissions. While it does verify a nonce via check_ajax_referer(), this nonce is generated for all authenticated users via the admin_enqueue_scripts hook and exposed on any wp-admin page (including profile.php, which subscribers can access). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to permanently delete taxonomy term records from the plugin&amp;#39;s trash/backup tables by sending a crafted AJAX request with a valid nonce and an arbitrary term_id.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-4128</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-gwg7-cjw3-gqff</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gwg7-cjw3-gqff</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The TP Restore Categories And Taxonomies plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. The delete_term() function, which handles the &amp;#39;tpmcattt_delete_term&amp;#39; AJAX action, does not perform any capability check (e.g., current_user_can()) to verify the user has sufficient permissions. While it does verify a nonce via check_ajax_referer(), this nonce is generated for all authenticated users via the admin_enqueue_scripts hook and exposed on any wp-admin page (including profile.php, which subscribers can access). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to permanently delete taxonomy term records from the plugin&amp;#39;s trash/backup tables by sending a crafted AJAX request with a valid nonce and an arbitrary term_id.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The TP Restore Categories And Taxonomies plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. The delete_term() function, which handles the &amp;#39;tpmcattt_delete_term&amp;#39; AJAX action, does not perform any capability check (e.g., current_user_can()) to verify the user has sufficient permissions. While it does verify a nonce via check_ajax_referer(), this nonce is generated for all authenticated users via the admin_enqueue_scripts hook and exposed on any wp-admin page (including profile.php, which subscribers can access). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to permanently delete taxonomy term records from the plugin&amp;#39;s trash/backup tables by sending a crafted AJAX request with a valid nonce and an arbitrary term_id.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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