https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 19:55:32 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-325659 EUVD-2026-325659 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-325659 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41249 <p>CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a &#34;Pwn Request&#34; vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.</p> <p>CoreShop is a Pimcore enhanced eCommerce solution. In versions 5.0.1 through 5.1.0-beta.1,, the GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a &#34;Pwn Request&#34; vulnerability. As of time of publication, `pull_request_target` is still in the file.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41249 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q58j-g3f4-h26h <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: coreshop/core-shop</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a &#34;Pwn Request&#34; vulnerability.</p> <p>**Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo &#34;=== PWNED ===&#34; echo &#34;whoami:&#34; whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner&#39;s context.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;490&#34; height=&#34;87&#34; alt=&#34;スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>**Impact:** Because `pul…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: coreshop/core-shop</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The GitHub Actions workflow (`.github/workflows/static.yml`) uses the `pull_request_target` trigger but dangerously checks out the unverified code from the pull request head (`ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}`). Subsequently, it executes a script (`bin/console`) from this untrusted checkout. This allows any external attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the GitHub Actions runner simply by submitting a malicious Pull Request. Also known as a &#34;Pwn Request&#34; vulnerability.</p> <p>**Steps to Reproduce:** 1. Fork the target repository. 2. In the forked repository, modify a file that satisfies the `paths` condition (e.g., `src/dummy.php` or `composer.json`) to trigger the workflow. 3. Modify the `bin/console` file (which is executed in the workflow steps) with the following malicious payload: ```bash #!/bin/bash echo &#34;=== PWNED ===&#34; echo &#34;whoami:&#34; whoami ``` 4. Commit the changes and open a Pull Request against the `5.0` or `next` branch of the base repository. 5. The `Static Tests` workflow will trigger automatically. Navigate to the Actions tab and inspect the logs for the `Validate YAML` (or any step executing `bin/console`). 6. You will see the output of `whoami` (typically `runner`), proving that the arbitrary code was successfully executed in the runner&#39;s context.</p> <p>&lt;img width=&#34;490&#34; height=&#34;87&#34; alt=&#34;スクリーンショット 2026-04-14 11 14 56&#34; src=&#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/94276033-b989-46dc-b4a1-3dafa1603235&#34; /&gt;</p> <p>**Impact:** Because `pul…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q58j-g3f4-h26h