<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:30:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292751</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292751</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292751</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292751</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41230</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41230</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, `DomainZones::add()` accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the `content` field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., `NAPTR`, `PTR`, `HINFO`), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive `trim()` processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via `DnsEntry::__toString()`. An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives (`$INCLUDE`, `$ORIGIN`, `$GENERATE`) into their domain&amp;#39;s zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, `DomainZones::add()` accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the `content` field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., `NAPTR`, `PTR`, `HINFO`), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive `trim()` processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via `DnsEntry::__toString()`. An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives (`$INCLUDE`, `$ORIGIN`, `$GENERATE`) into their domain&amp;#39;s zone file. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41230</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-47hf-23pw-3m8c — Froxlor has a BIND Zone File Injection via Unsanitized DNS Record Content in DomainZones::add()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-47hf-23pw-3m8c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: froxlor/froxlor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DomainZones::add()` accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the `content` field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., `NAPTR`, `PTR`, `HINFO`), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive `trim()` processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via `DnsEntry::__toString()`. An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives (`$INCLUDE`, `$ORIGIN`, `$GENERATE`) into their domain&amp;#39;s zone file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Missing type whitelist — `DomainZones.php:93`:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `type` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93
$type = $this-&amp;gt;getParam(&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;, true, &amp;#39;A&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: `A`, `AAAA`, `CAA`, `CNAME`, `DNAME`, `LOC`, `MX`, `NS`, `RP`, `SRV`, `SSHFP`, `TLSA`, `TXT`. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a `TODO` comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// TODO regex validate content for invalid characters
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Missing newline sanitization — `DomainZones.php:154`:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The content field only receives `trim()`, which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Comm…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: froxlor/froxlor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`DomainZones::add()` accepts arbitrary DNS record types without a whitelist and does not sanitize newline characters in the `content` field. When a DNS type not covered by the if/elseif validation chain is submitted (e.g., `NAPTR`, `PTR`, `HINFO`), content validation is entirely bypassed. Embedded newline characters in the content survive `trim()` processing, are stored in the database, and are written directly into BIND zone files via `DnsEntry::__toString()`. An authenticated customer can inject arbitrary DNS records and BIND directives (`$INCLUDE`, `$ORIGIN`, `$GENERATE`) into their domain&amp;#39;s zone file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Missing type whitelist — `DomainZones.php:93`:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `type` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation against allowed values:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/DomainZones.php:93
$type = $this-&amp;gt;getParam(&amp;#39;type&amp;#39;, true, &amp;#39;A&amp;#39;);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The if/elseif chain at lines 170-317 validates content only for 13 known types: `A`, `AAAA`, `CAA`, `CNAME`, `DNAME`, `LOC`, `MX`, `NS`, `RP`, `SRV`, `SSHFP`, `TLSA`, `TXT`. Any type not in this list falls through with no content validation at all. There is a `TODO` comment at line 148 acknowledging missing validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// TODO regex validate content for invalid characters
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Missing newline sanitization — `DomainZones.php:154`:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The content field only receives `trim()`, which strips leading/trailing whitespace but preserves embedded newline characters:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// lib/Froxlor/Api/Comm…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-47hf-23pw-3m8c</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1124 — Froxlor: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1124</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode auszuführen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, und um Dateien zu manipulieren.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1124</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
