https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 17 Oct 2026 03:41:51 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292752 EUVD-2026-292752 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292752 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41180 <p>PsiTransfer is an open source, self-hosted file sharing solution. Prior to version 2.4.3, the upload PATCH flow under `/files/:uploadId` validates the mounted request path using the still-encoded `req.path`, but the downstream tus handler later writes using the decoded `req.params.uploadId`. In deployments that use a supported custom `PSITRANSFER_UPLOAD_DIR` whose basename prefixes a startup-loaded JavaScript path, such as `conf`, an unauthenticated attacker can create `config.&lt;NODE_ENV&gt;.js` in the application root. The attacker-controlled file is then executed on the next process restart. Version 2.4.3 contains a patch.</p> <p>PsiTransfer is an open source, self-hosted file sharing solution. Prior to version 2.4.3, the upload PATCH flow under `/files/:uploadId` validates the mounted request path using the still-encoded `req.path`, but the downstream tus handler later writes using the decoded `req.params.uploadId`. In deployments that use a supported custom `PSITRANSFER_UPLOAD_DIR` whose basename prefixes a startup-loaded JavaScript path, such as `conf`, an unauthenticated attacker can create `config.&lt;NODE_ENV&gt;.js` in the application root. The attacker-controlled file is then executed on the next process restart. Version 2.4.3 contains a patch.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41180 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-533q-w4g6-5586 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: psitransfer</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The upload PATCH flow under `/files/:uploadId` validates the mounted request path using the still-encoded `req.path`, but the downstream tus handler later writes using the decoded `req.params.uploadId`. In deployments that use a supported custom `PSITRANSFER_UPLOAD_DIR` whose basename prefixes a startup-loaded JavaScript path, such as `conf`, an unauthenticated attacker can create `config.&lt;NODE_ENV&gt;.js` in the application root. The attacker-controlled file is then executed on the next process restart.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Observed in `2.4.1`, the upload middleware derives `fid` from `req.path.substring(1)` and calls `store.info(fid)` before handing the request to tus. For a request such as `/files/..%2Fconfig.production.js`, this outer check sees the encoded value `..%2Fconfig.production.js`. The downstream `patch(&#39;/:uploadId&#39;)` route, however, receives the decoded parameter `../config.production.js`. In the same code path, the `catch` branch uses `if(! e instanceof httpErrors.NotFound)`, which does not correctly stop execution on a missing upload target.</p> <p>The write sink is `Store.getFilename(fid)`, which resolves `path.resolve(uploadDir, fid.replace(&#39;++&#39;, &#39;/&#39;))` and then only checks `startsWith(uploadDir)`. With a supported custom upload directory such as `&lt;app_root&gt;/conf`, the decoded target `../config.production.js` resolves to `&lt;app_root&gt;/config.production.js`, and the current string-prefix jail check still accepts it because the resolved path begins with `&lt;app_roo…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: psitransfer</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The upload PATCH flow under `/files/:uploadId` validates the mounted request path using the still-encoded `req.path`, but the downstream tus handler later writes using the decoded `req.params.uploadId`. In deployments that use a supported custom `PSITRANSFER_UPLOAD_DIR` whose basename prefixes a startup-loaded JavaScript path, such as `conf`, an unauthenticated attacker can create `config.&lt;NODE_ENV&gt;.js` in the application root. The attacker-controlled file is then executed on the next process restart.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>Observed in `2.4.1`, the upload middleware derives `fid` from `req.path.substring(1)` and calls `store.info(fid)` before handing the request to tus. For a request such as `/files/..%2Fconfig.production.js`, this outer check sees the encoded value `..%2Fconfig.production.js`. The downstream `patch(&#39;/:uploadId&#39;)` route, however, receives the decoded parameter `../config.production.js`. In the same code path, the `catch` branch uses `if(! e instanceof httpErrors.NotFound)`, which does not correctly stop execution on a missing upload target.</p> <p>The write sink is `Store.getFilename(fid)`, which resolves `path.resolve(uploadDir, fid.replace(&#39;++&#39;, &#39;/&#39;))` and then only checks `startsWith(uploadDir)`. With a supported custom upload directory such as `&lt;app_root&gt;/conf`, the decoded target `../config.production.js` resolves to `&lt;app_root&gt;/config.production.js`, and the current string-prefix jail check still accepts it because the resolved path begins with `&lt;app_roo…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-533q-w4g6-5586