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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292618</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292618</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292618</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292618</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-41062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41062</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL path component (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode(&amp;#39;/videos/&amp;#39;, $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Commit bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL path component (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode(&amp;#39;/videos/&amp;#39;, $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Commit bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441 contains an updated fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m63r-m9jh-3vc6 — WWBN AVideo has an Incomplete fix: Directory traversal bypass via query string in ReceiveImage downloadURL parameters</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m63r-m9jh-3vc6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL **path component** (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode(&amp;#39;/videos/&amp;#39;, $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security fix at commit 2375eb5e0 added a traversal check at `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:49`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$decodedPath = urldecode((string)(parse_url($_REQUEST[$value], PHP_URL_PATH) ?? &amp;#39;&amp;#39;));
if (strpos($decodedPath, &amp;#39;..&amp;#39;) !== false) {
    unset($_REQUEST[$value]);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This only inspects the **path component** of the URL. For a URL like `http://TARGET/x?a=/videos/../../etc/passwd`, `parse_url()` returns `/x` as the path — no `..` is found.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL then passes through `isValidURL()` (`objects/functions.php:4203`) which accepts it because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` considers `..` in query strings valid per RFC 3986.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also passes `isSSRFSafeURL()` (`objects/functions.php:4264`) because the host matches `webSiteRootURL`, causing an early return at line 4294.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL reaches `url_get_contents()` (`objects/functions.php:1938`) which calls `try_get_contents_from_local()` (`objects/functionsFile.php…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL **path component** (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode(&amp;#39;/videos/&amp;#39;, $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security fix at commit 2375eb5e0 added a traversal check at `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:49`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$decodedPath = urldecode((string)(parse_url($_REQUEST[$value], PHP_URL_PATH) ?? &amp;#39;&amp;#39;));
if (strpos($decodedPath, &amp;#39;..&amp;#39;) !== false) {
    unset($_REQUEST[$value]);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This only inspects the **path component** of the URL. For a URL like `http://TARGET/x?a=/videos/../../etc/passwd`, `parse_url()` returns `/x` as the path — no `..` is found.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL then passes through `isValidURL()` (`objects/functions.php:4203`) which accepts it because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` considers `..` in query strings valid per RFC 3986.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It also passes `isSSRFSafeURL()` (`objects/functions.php:4264`) because the host matches `webSiteRootURL`, causing an early return at line 4294.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL reaches `url_get_contents()` (`objects/functions.php:1938`) which calls `try_get_contents_from_local()` (`objects/functionsFile.php…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m63r-m9jh-3vc6</guid>
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