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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 12:03:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-292393</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292393</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292393</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292393</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40944</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40944</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Oxia is a metadata store and coordination system. Prior to 0.16.2, the trustedCertPool() function in the TLS configuration only parses the first PEM block from CA certificate files. When a CA bundle contains multiple certificates (e.g., intermediate + root CA), only the first certificate is loaded. This silently breaks certificate chain validation for mTLS. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Oxia is a metadata store and coordination system. Prior to 0.16.2, the trustedCertPool() function in the TLS configuration only parses the first PEM block from CA certificate files. When a CA bundle contains multiple certificates (e.g., intermediate + root CA), only the first certificate is loaded. This silently breaks certificate chain validation for mTLS. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.16.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40944</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7jrq-q4pq-rhm6 — Oxia's TLS CA certificate chain validation fails with multi-certificate PEM bundles</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7jrq-q4pq-rhm6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/oxia-db/oxia&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `trustedCertPool()` function in the TLS configuration only parses the first PEM block from CA certificate files. When a CA bundle contains multiple certificates (e.g., intermediate + root CA), only the first certificate is loaded. This silently breaks certificate chain validation for mTLS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
In deployments using mTLS with certificate chains (intermediate CA + root CA bundles), legitimate clients with properly chained certificates are rejected with `x509: certificate signed by unknown authority`. This degrades the security posture by making mTLS unusable with standard CA chain configurations, potentially forcing operators to disable client certificate verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All versions using TLS with `trustedCaFile` configuration are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In `common/security/tls.go`, the `trustedCertPool()` method calls `pem.Decode()` only once, processing a single PEM block. The remaining bytes (containing additional certificates) are silently discarded. Additionally, the error return from `pem.Decode` is ignored, so a corrupted CA file results in an empty certificate pool without any error.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
Fixed by iterating over all PEM blocks in the file, parsing each CERTIFICATE block, and returning an error if no valid certificates are found.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Use CA files containing only a single certificate (the direct issuer of client certificates, not a chain).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/oxia-db/oxia&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The `trustedCertPool()` function in the TLS configuration only parses the first PEM block from CA certificate files. When a CA bundle contains multiple certificates (e.g., intermediate + root CA), only the first certificate is loaded. This silently breaks certificate chain validation for mTLS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
In deployments using mTLS with certificate chains (intermediate CA + root CA bundles), legitimate clients with properly chained certificates are rejected with `x509: certificate signed by unknown authority`. This degrades the security posture by making mTLS unusable with standard CA chain configurations, potentially forcing operators to disable client certificate verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All versions using TLS with `trustedCaFile` configuration are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
In `common/security/tls.go`, the `trustedCertPool()` method calls `pem.Decode()` only once, processing a single PEM block. The remaining bytes (containing additional certificates) are silently discarded. Additionally, the error return from `pem.Decode` is ignored, so a corrupted CA file results in an empty certificate pool without any error.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
Fixed by iterating over all PEM blocks in the file, parsing each CERTIFICATE block, and returning an error if no valid certificates are found.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Use CA files containing only a single certificate (the direct issuer of client certificates, not a chain).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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