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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 09:55:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292671</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292671</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292671</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292671</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40935</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40935</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, `objects/getCaptcha.php` accepts the CAPTCHA length (`ql`) directly from the query string with no clamping or sanitization, letting any unauthenticated client force the server to generate a 1-character CAPTCHA word. Combined with a case-insensitive `strcasecmp` comparison over a ~33-character alphabet and the fact that failed validations do NOT consume the stored session token, an attacker can trivially brute-force the CAPTCHA on any endpoint that relies on `Captcha::validation()` (user registration, password recovery, contact form, etc.) in at most ~33 requests per session. Commit bf1c76989e6a9054be4f0eb009d68f0f2464b453 contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, `objects/getCaptcha.php` accepts the CAPTCHA length (`ql`) directly from the query string with no clamping or sanitization, letting any unauthenticated client force the server to generate a 1-character CAPTCHA word. Combined with a case-insensitive `strcasecmp` comparison over a ~33-character alphabet and the fact that failed validations do NOT consume the stored session token, an attacker can trivially brute-force the CAPTCHA on any endpoint that relies on `Captcha::validation()` (user registration, password recovery, contact form, etc.) in at most ~33 requests per session. Commit bf1c76989e6a9054be4f0eb009d68f0f2464b453 contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40935</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hg7g-56h5-5pqr — CAPTCHA Bypass in WWBN/AVideo via Attacker-Controlled Length Parameter and Missing Token Invalidation on Failure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hg7g-56h5-5pqr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`objects/getCaptcha.php` accepts the CAPTCHA length (`ql`) directly from the query string with no clamping or sanitization, letting any unauthenticated client force the server to generate a 1-character CAPTCHA word. Combined with a case-insensitive `strcasecmp` comparison over a ~33-character alphabet and the fact that failed validations do NOT consume the stored session token, an attacker can trivially brute-force the CAPTCHA on any endpoint that relies on `Captcha::validation()` (user registration, password recovery, contact form, etc.) in at most ~33 requests per session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three cooperating flaws in `objects/getCaptcha.php` and `objects/captcha.php` reduce CAPTCHA protection to a deterministic bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 1. External control of CAPTCHA strength (`objects/getCaptcha.php:7`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$largura        = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;l&amp;#39;])  ? 120 : $_GET[&amp;#39;l&amp;#39;];
$altura         = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;a&amp;#39;])  ? 40  : $_GET[&amp;#39;a&amp;#39;];
$tamanho_fonte  = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;tf&amp;#39;]) ? 18  : $_GET[&amp;#39;tf&amp;#39;];
$quantidade_letras = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;ql&amp;#39;]) ? 5 : $_GET[&amp;#39;ql&amp;#39;]; // attacker-controlled&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$capcha = new Captcha($largura, $altura, $tamanho_fonte, $quantidade_letras);
$capcha-&amp;gt;getCaptchaImage();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no minimum, no type-check, and no clamping. Requesting `/objects/getCaptcha.php?ql=1` causes the server to generate a single-character word and save it to the attacker&amp;#39;s own PHP session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2. Small alphabet stored in the session (`objects/captcha.php:33-39`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$letters = &amp;#39;AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHhIiJjKk…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`objects/getCaptcha.php` accepts the CAPTCHA length (`ql`) directly from the query string with no clamping or sanitization, letting any unauthenticated client force the server to generate a 1-character CAPTCHA word. Combined with a case-insensitive `strcasecmp` comparison over a ~33-character alphabet and the fact that failed validations do NOT consume the stored session token, an attacker can trivially brute-force the CAPTCHA on any endpoint that relies on `Captcha::validation()` (user registration, password recovery, contact form, etc.) in at most ~33 requests per session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three cooperating flaws in `objects/getCaptcha.php` and `objects/captcha.php` reduce CAPTCHA protection to a deterministic bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 1. External control of CAPTCHA strength (`objects/getCaptcha.php:7`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$largura        = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;l&amp;#39;])  ? 120 : $_GET[&amp;#39;l&amp;#39;];
$altura         = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;a&amp;#39;])  ? 40  : $_GET[&amp;#39;a&amp;#39;];
$tamanho_fonte  = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;tf&amp;#39;]) ? 18  : $_GET[&amp;#39;tf&amp;#39;];
$quantidade_letras = empty($_GET[&amp;#39;ql&amp;#39;]) ? 5 : $_GET[&amp;#39;ql&amp;#39;]; // attacker-controlled&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$capcha = new Captcha($largura, $altura, $tamanho_fonte, $quantidade_letras);
$capcha-&amp;gt;getCaptchaImage();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no minimum, no type-check, and no clamping. Requesting `/objects/getCaptcha.php?ql=1` causes the server to generate a single-character word and save it to the attacker&amp;#39;s own PHP session.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### 2. Small alphabet stored in the session (`objects/captcha.php:33-39`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$letters = &amp;#39;AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHhIiJjKk…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hg7g-56h5-5pqr</guid>
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