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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 22:25:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292397</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292397</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292397</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292397</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40911</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40911</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, the YPTSocket plugin&amp;#39;s WebSocket server relays attacker-supplied JSON message bodies to every connected client without sanitizing the `msg` or `callback` fields. On the client side, `plugin/YPTSocket/script.js` contains two `eval()` sinks fed directly by those relayed fields (`json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML` at line 568 and `json.callback` at line 95). Because tokens are minted for anonymous visitors and never revalidated beyond decryption, an unauthenticated attacker can broadcast arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the origin of every currently-connected user (including administrators), resulting in universal account takeover, session theft, and privileged action execution. Commit c08694bf6264eb4decceb78c711baee2609b4efd contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, the YPTSocket plugin&amp;#39;s WebSocket server relays attacker-supplied JSON message bodies to every connected client without sanitizing the `msg` or `callback` fields. On the client side, `plugin/YPTSocket/script.js` contains two `eval()` sinks fed directly by those relayed fields (`json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML` at line 568 and `json.callback` at line 95). Because tokens are minted for anonymous visitors and never revalidated beyond decryption, an unauthenticated attacker can broadcast arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the origin of every currently-connected user (including administrators), resulting in universal account takeover, session theft, and privileged action execution. Commit c08694bf6264eb4decceb78c711baee2609b4efd contains a fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40911</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gph2-j4c9-vhhr — WWBN AVideo YPTSocket WebSocket Broadcast Relay Leads to Unauthenticated Cross-User JavaScript Execution via Client-Sid…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gph2-j4c9-vhhr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The YPTSocket plugin&amp;#39;s WebSocket server relays attacker-supplied JSON message bodies to every connected client without sanitizing the `msg` or `callback` fields. On the client side, `plugin/YPTSocket/script.js` contains two `eval()` sinks fed directly by those relayed fields (`json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML` at line 568 and `json.callback` at line 95). Because tokens are minted for anonymous visitors and never revalidated beyond decryption, an unauthenticated attacker can broadcast arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the origin of every currently-connected user (including administrators), resulting in universal account takeover, session theft, and privileged action execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Token issuance is unauthenticated&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php:11-21` returns a token to anyone whose request reaches the endpoint — the only check is that the plugin is enabled:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if(!AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName(&amp;#34;YPTSocket&amp;#34;)){
    $obj-&amp;gt;msg = &amp;#34;Socket plugin not enabled&amp;#34;;
    die(json_encode($obj));
}
$obj-&amp;gt;error = false;
$obj-&amp;gt;webSocketToken = getEncryptedInfo(0);
$obj-&amp;gt;webSocketURL = YPTSocket::getWebSocketURL();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`getEncryptedInfo()` in `plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:3-16` populates `from_users_id = User::getId()` (0 for guests) and `isAdmin = User::isAdmin()` (false for guests). The issued token is accepted by the WebSocket server&amp;#39;s `onOpen` handler (`Message.php:44-52`) solely by successful decryption — there is no requirement for the connecting…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The YPTSocket plugin&amp;#39;s WebSocket server relays attacker-supplied JSON message bodies to every connected client without sanitizing the `msg` or `callback` fields. On the client side, `plugin/YPTSocket/script.js` contains two `eval()` sinks fed directly by those relayed fields (`json.msg.autoEvalCodeOnHTML` at line 568 and `json.callback` at line 95). Because tokens are minted for anonymous visitors and never revalidated beyond decryption, an unauthenticated attacker can broadcast arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the origin of every currently-connected user (including administrators), resulting in universal account takeover, session theft, and privileged action execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Token issuance is unauthenticated&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php:11-21` returns a token to anyone whose request reaches the endpoint — the only check is that the plugin is enabled:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
if(!AVideoPlugin::isEnabledByName(&amp;#34;YPTSocket&amp;#34;)){
    $obj-&amp;gt;msg = &amp;#34;Socket plugin not enabled&amp;#34;;
    die(json_encode($obj));
}
$obj-&amp;gt;error = false;
$obj-&amp;gt;webSocketToken = getEncryptedInfo(0);
$obj-&amp;gt;webSocketURL = YPTSocket::getWebSocketURL();
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`getEncryptedInfo()` in `plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:3-16` populates `from_users_id = User::getId()` (0 for guests) and `isAdmin = User::isAdmin()` (false for guests). The issued token is accepted by the WebSocket server&amp;#39;s `onOpen` handler (`Message.php:44-52`) solely by successful decryption — there is no requirement for the connecting…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gph2-j4c9-vhhr</guid>
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