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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 21:19:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-homeassistant-cli-CVE-2026-40602 — hass-cli: Handling of user-supplied Jinja2 templates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-homeassistant-cli-cve-2026-40602</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: homeassistant-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Home Assistant Command-line interface (hass-cli) is a command-line tool for Home Assistant. Up to 1.0.0 of home-assitant-cli an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: homeassistant-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Home Assistant Command-line interface (hass-cli) is a command-line tool for Home Assistant. Up to 1.0.0 of home-assitant-cli an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-homeassistant-cli-cve-2026-40602</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292255</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292255</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292255</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292255</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40602</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40602</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Home Assistant Command-line interface (hass-cli) is a command-line tool for Home Assistant. Up to 1.0.0 of home-assitant-cli an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Home Assistant Command-line interface (hass-cli) is a command-line tool for Home Assistant. Up to 1.0.0 of home-assitant-cli an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40602</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-33qf-q99x-wpm8 — Home Assistant Command-line Interface: Handling of user-supplied Jinja2 templates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-33qf-q99x-wpm8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: homeassistant-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 1.0.0 of `home-assitant-cli` (or `hass-cli` for short) an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E. g., it was possible to render a template with `hass-cli template bad-template.j2 --local` that contained entries like&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````j2
{%- set b   = environ.__globals__[&amp;#39;__builtins__&amp;#39;] -%}
{%- set os  = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;) -%}
{%- set bio = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;builtins&amp;#39;) -%}
...
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;or other malicious Jinja2 expressions. This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the local machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a two step process an adversary could trick/convince an user to download third-party templates which contain harmful code (e. g., perform data manipulation or establish a remote shell)  then to render those templates unchecked/reviewed/verified with `--local`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only affect the local machine and not a remote Home Assistant instance. It also requires user interventions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1.0.0 uses `ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment` and restricts the usage of environment variables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Evaluate the Jninja2 templates manually or  tool-based before rendering with `hass-cli`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: homeassistant-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 1.0.0 of `home-assitant-cli` (or `hass-cli` for short) an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E. g., it was possible to render a template with `hass-cli template bad-template.j2 --local` that contained entries like&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````j2
{%- set b   = environ.__globals__[&amp;#39;__builtins__&amp;#39;] -%}
{%- set os  = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;) -%}
{%- set bio = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;builtins&amp;#39;) -%}
...
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;or other malicious Jinja2 expressions. This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the local machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a two step process an adversary could trick/convince an user to download third-party templates which contain harmful code (e. g., perform data manipulation or establish a remote shell)  then to render those templates unchecked/reviewed/verified with `--local`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only affect the local machine and not a remote Home Assistant instance. It also requires user interventions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1.0.0 uses `ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment` and restricts the usage of environment variables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Evaluate the Jninja2 templates manually or  tool-based before rendering with `hass-cli`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-33qf-q99x-wpm8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-2518 — Home Assistant Command-line Interface: Handling of user-supplied Jinja2 templates</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2518</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: homeassistant-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 1.0.0 of `home-assitant-cli` (or `hass-cli` for short) an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E. g., it was possible to render a template with `hass-cli template bad-template.j2 --local` that contained entries like&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````j2
{%- set b   = environ.__globals__[&amp;#39;__builtins__&amp;#39;] -%}
{%- set os  = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;) -%}
{%- set bio = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;builtins&amp;#39;) -%}
...
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;or other malicious Jinja2 expressions. This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the local machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a two step process an adversary could trick/convince an user to download third-party templates which contain harmful code (e. g., perform data manipulation or establish a remote shell)  then to render those templates unchecked/reviewed/verified with `--local`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only affect the local machine and not a remote Home Assistant instance. It also requires user interventions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1.0.0 uses `ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment` and restricts the usage of environment variables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Evaluate the Jninja2 templates manually or  tool-based before rendering with `hass-cli`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: homeassistant-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 1.0.0 of `home-assitant-cli` (or `hass-cli` for short) an unrestricted environment was used to handle Jninja2 templates instead of a sandboxed one. The user-supplied input within Jinja2 templates was rendered locally with no restrictions. This gave users access to Python&amp;#39;s internals and extended the scope of templating beyond the intended usage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;E. g., it was possible to render a template with `hass-cli template bad-template.j2 --local` that contained entries like&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;````j2
{%- set b   = environ.__globals__[&amp;#39;__builtins__&amp;#39;] -%}
{%- set os  = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;os&amp;#39;) -%}
{%- set bio = b[&amp;#39;__import__&amp;#39;](&amp;#39;builtins&amp;#39;) -%}
...
````&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;or other malicious Jinja2 expressions. This can lead to arbitrary code execution on the local machine.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a two step process an adversary could trick/convince an user to download third-party templates which contain harmful code (e. g., perform data manipulation or establish a remote shell)  then to render those templates unchecked/reviewed/verified with `--local`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue only affect the local machine and not a remote Home Assistant instance. It also requires user interventions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1.0.0 uses `ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment` and restricts the usage of environment variables.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Evaluate the Jninja2 templates manually or  tool-based before rendering with `hass-cli`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2518</guid>
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