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      <title>EUVD-2026-291267</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-291267</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-291267</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-291267</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40313</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40313</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 4.5.139 and below, the GitHub Actions workflows are vulnerable to ArtiPACKED attack, a known credential leakage vector caused by using actions/checkout without setting persist-credentials: false. By default, actions/checkout writes the GITHUB_TOKEN (and sometimes ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN) into the .git/config file for persistence, and if any subsequent workflow step uploads artifacts (build outputs, logs, test results, etc.), these tokens can be inadvertently included. Since PraisonAI is a public repository, any user with read access can download these artifacts and extract the leaked tokens, potentially enabling an attacker to push malicious code, poison releases and PyPI/Docker packages, steal repository secrets, and execute a full supply chain compromise affecting all downstream users. The issue spans numerous workflow and action files across .github/workflows/ and .github/actions/. This issue has been fixed in version 4.5.140.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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