https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 08 Oct 2026 09:51:03 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-291847 EUVD-2026-291847 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-291847 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40247 <p>free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In versions 4.2.1 and below of the UDR service, the handler for reading Traffic Influence Subscriptions checks whether the influenceId path segment equals subs-to-notify, but does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response when validation fails. Execution continues and the subscription data is returned alongside the 404 response. An unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface can read arbitrary Traffic Influence Subscriptions, including SUPIs/IMSIs, DNNs, S-NSSAIs, and callback URIs, by supplying any value for the influenceId path segment. A patched version was not available at the time of publication.</p> <p>free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In versions 4.2.1 and below of the UDR service, the handler for reading Traffic Influence Subscriptions checks whether the influenceId path segment equals subs-to-notify, but does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response when validation fails. Execution continues and the subscription data is returned alongside the 404 response. An unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface can read arbitrary Traffic Influence Subscriptions, including SUPIs/IMSIs, DNNs, S-NSSAIs, and callback URIs, by supplying any value for the influenceId path segment. A patched version was not available at the time of publication.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40247 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x5r2-r74c-3w28 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/free5gc/udr</p> <p>### Summary An improper path validation vulnerability in the UDR service allows any unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface (SBI) to read Traffic Influence Subscriptions by supplying an arbitrary value in place of the expected `subs-to-notify` path segment.</p> <p>### Details The endpoint `GET /nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/{influenceId}/{subscriptionId}` is intended to only operate on Traffic Influence Subscription resources when `influenceId` is exactly `subs-to-notify`.</p> <p>In the free5GC UDR implementation, the path validation is present but ineffective because the handler does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response. The request handling flow is:</p> <p>1. The function `HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdGet` in `./free5gc_4-2-1/free5gc/NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go` checks whether `influenceId != &#34;subs-to-notify&#34;`. 2. If the value is different, it calls `c.String(http.StatusNotFound, &#34;404 page not found&#34;)`, **but it does not return afterwards**. 3. Execution continues and the handler still calls `s.Processor().ApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdGetProcedure(c, subscriptionId)`. 4. The processor retrieves and returns the subscription identified by `subscriptionId` even though the path is invalid and the request should have been rejected.</p> <p>As a result, an attacker can send a request to an invalid path, receive an apparent `404 page not found` response, and still obtain the full su…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/free5gc/udr</p> <p>### Summary An improper path validation vulnerability in the UDR service allows any unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface (SBI) to read Traffic Influence Subscriptions by supplying an arbitrary value in place of the expected `subs-to-notify` path segment.</p> <p>### Details The endpoint `GET /nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/{influenceId}/{subscriptionId}` is intended to only operate on Traffic Influence Subscription resources when `influenceId` is exactly `subs-to-notify`.</p> <p>In the free5GC UDR implementation, the path validation is present but ineffective because the handler does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response. The request handling flow is:</p> <p>1. The function `HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdGet` in `./free5gc_4-2-1/free5gc/NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go` checks whether `influenceId != &#34;subs-to-notify&#34;`. 2. If the value is different, it calls `c.String(http.StatusNotFound, &#34;404 page not found&#34;)`, **but it does not return afterwards**. 3. Execution continues and the handler still calls `s.Processor().ApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdGetProcedure(c, subscriptionId)`. 4. The processor retrieves and returns the subscription identified by `subscriptionId` even though the path is invalid and the request should have been rejected.</p> <p>As a result, an attacker can send a request to an invalid path, receive an apparent `404 page not found` response, and still obtain the full su…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x5r2-r74c-3w28