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EUVD-2026-290873

fkie_cve-2026-40160

PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, web_crawl's httpx fallback path passes user-supplied URLs directly to httpx.AsyncClient.get() with follow_redirects=True and no host validation. An LLM agent tricked into crawling an internal URL can reach cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and localhost. The response content is returned to the agent and may appear in output visible to the attacker. This fallback is the default crawl path on a fresh PraisonAI installation (no Tavily key, no Crawl4AI installed). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128.

GHSA-qq9r-63f6-v542 — PraisonAIAgents: SSRF via unvalidated URL in `web_crawl` httpx fallback

Affected: PyPI: praisonaiagents

| Field | Value | |---|---| | Severity | High | | Type | SSRF -- unvalidated URL in `web_crawl` httpx fallback allows internal network access | | Affected | `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/web_crawl_tools.py:133-180` |

## Summary

`web_crawl`'s httpx fallback path passes user-supplied URLs directly to `httpx.AsyncClient.get()` with `follow_redirects=True` and no host validation. An LLM agent tricked into crawling an internal URL can reach cloud metadata endpoints (`169.254.169.254`), internal services, and localhost. The response content is returned to the agent and may appear in output visible to the attacker.

This fallback is the default crawl path on a fresh PraisonAI installation (no Tavily key, no Crawl4AI installed).

## Details

The vulnerable code is in `tools/web_crawl_tools.py:148-155`:

```python async with httpx.AsyncClient( follow_redirects=True, timeout=httpx.Timeout(30) ) as client: response = await client.get(url) # url from agent tool call, no validation ```

No scheme restriction, no hostname resolution, no private/link-local IP check. `follow_redirects=True` also means an attacker can use an open redirect on a public URL to bounce the request into internal networks.

`download_file` in `file_tools.py:295-318`, by contrast, validates URLs before requesting:

```python parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"): return "Error: Only HTTP(S) URLs are allowed" hostname = parsed.hostname addr = ip…

PYSEC-2026-2951 — PraisonAIAgents: SSRF via unvalidated URL in `web_crawl` httpx fallback