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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 21:21:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-290884</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290884</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-290884</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290884</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40111</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40111</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py. No sanitization is performed and shell metacharacters are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes. Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py. No sanitization is performed and shell metacharacters are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes. Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40111</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-v7px-3835-7gjx — PraisonAIAgents has an OS Command Injection via shell=True in Memory Hooks Executor (memory/hooks.py)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v7px-3835-7gjx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string
directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py lines 303 to 305.
No sanitization, no shlex.quote(), no character filter, and no allowlist check
exists anywhere in this file. Shell metacharacters including semicolons, pipes,
ampersands, backticks, dollar-sign substitutions, and newlines are interpreted by
/bin/sh before the intended command executes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and
post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration.
The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle
configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and
AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains
file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json
and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without
further user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This file and these surfaces are not covered by any existing published advisory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerability Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File    : src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py
Lines   : 303 to 305&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;result = subprocess.run(
        command,
        shell=True,
        cwd=str(self.workspace_path),
        env=env,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=hook.timeout
    )&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The variable comm…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string
directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py lines 303 to 305.
No sanitization, no shlex.quote(), no character filter, and no allowlist check
exists anywhere in this file. Shell metacharacters including semicolons, pipes,
ampersands, backticks, dollar-sign substitutions, and newlines are interpreted by
/bin/sh before the intended command executes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and
post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration.
The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle
configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and
AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains
file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json
and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without
further user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This file and these surfaces are not covered by any existing published advisory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerability Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File    : src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py
Lines   : 303 to 305&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;result = subprocess.run(
        command,
        shell=True,
        cwd=str(self.workspace_path),
        env=env,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=hook.timeout
    )&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The variable comm…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-v7px-3835-7gjx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-487 — PraisonAIAgents has an OS Command Injection via shell=True in Memory Hooks Executor (memory/hooks.py)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-487</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string
directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py lines 303 to 305.
No sanitization, no shlex.quote(), no character filter, and no allowlist check
exists anywhere in this file. Shell metacharacters including semicolons, pipes,
ampersands, backticks, dollar-sign substitutions, and newlines are interpreted by
/bin/sh before the intended command executes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and
post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration.
The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle
configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and
AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains
 file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json
 and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without
 further user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This file and these surfaces are not covered by any existing published advisory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerability Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File    : src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py
Lines   : 303 to 305&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;result = subprocess.run(
        command,
        shell=True,
        cwd=str(self.workspace_path),
        env=env,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=hook.timeout
    )&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The variable c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonaiagents&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string
directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py lines 303 to 305.
No sanitization, no shlex.quote(), no character filter, and no allowlist check
exists anywhere in this file. Shell metacharacters including semicolons, pipes,
ampersands, backticks, dollar-sign substitutions, and newlines are interpreted by
/bin/sh before the intended command executes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and
post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration.
The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle
configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and
AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains
 file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json
 and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without
 further user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This file and these surfaces are not covered by any existing published advisory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerability Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File    : src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py
Lines   : 303 to 305&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vulnerable code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;result = subprocess.run(
        command,
        shell=True,
        cwd=str(self.workspace_path),
        env=env,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
        timeout=hook.timeout
    )&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The variable c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-487</guid>
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