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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 08:12:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-292141</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292141</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-292141</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292141</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40098</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40098</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Magento Long Term Support (LTS) is an unofficial, community-driven project provides an alternative to the Magento Community Edition e-commerce platform with a high level of backward compatibility. Prior to version 20.17.0, the shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public `sharing_code`, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global `wishlist_item_id` and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code. This lets an attacker use a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A and a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B to import victim item B into the attacker&amp;#39;s cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A. Because the victim item&amp;#39;s stored `buyRequest` is reused during cart import, the victim&amp;#39;s private custom-option data is copied into the attacker&amp;#39;s quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound. Version 20.17.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Magento Long Term Support (LTS) is an unofficial, community-driven project provides an alternative to the Magento Community Edition e-commerce platform with a high level of backward compatibility. Prior to version 20.17.0, the shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public `sharing_code`, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global `wishlist_item_id` and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code. This lets an attacker use a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A and a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B to import victim item B into the attacker&amp;#39;s cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A. Because the victim item&amp;#39;s stored `buyRequest` is reused during cart import, the victim&amp;#39;s private custom-option data is copied into the attacker&amp;#39;s quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound. Version 20.17.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40098</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-665x-ppc4-685w — OpenMage LTS: Cross-user wishlist import leads to private option &amp; file disclosure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-665x-ppc4-685w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: openmage/magento-lts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-user wishlist item import via shared wishlist code, leading to private option disclosure and file-disclosure variant&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public `sharing_code`, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global `wishlist_item_id` and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This lets an attacker use:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A
- a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;to import victim item B into the attacker&amp;#39;s cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the victim item&amp;#39;s stored `buyRequest` is reused during cart import, the victim&amp;#39;s private custom-option data is copied into the attacker&amp;#39;s quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Type&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Broken object-level authorization / IDOR
- Cross-user data disclosure
- Cross-user file disclosure variant&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/SharedController.php`, the shared flow does:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$item = Mage::getModel(&amp;#39;wishlist/item&amp;#39;)-&amp;gt;load($itemId);
$wishlist = Mage::getModel(&amp;#39;wishlist/wishlist&amp;#39;)-&amp;gt;loadByCode($code);
...
$item-&amp;gt;addToCart($cart);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant lines:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `SharedController.php:86` loads the wishlist item by global ID
- `SharedController.php:87` loads the wishlist by…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: openmage/magento-lts&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Cross-user wishlist item import via shared wishlist code, leading to private option disclosure and file-disclosure variant&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public `sharing_code`, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global `wishlist_item_id` and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This lets an attacker use:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A
- a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;to import victim item B into the attacker&amp;#39;s cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because the victim item&amp;#39;s stored `buyRequest` is reused during cart import, the victim&amp;#39;s private custom-option data is copied into the attacker&amp;#39;s quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Type&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Broken object-level authorization / IDOR
- Cross-user data disclosure
- Cross-user file disclosure variant&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/SharedController.php`, the shared flow does:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
$item = Mage::getModel(&amp;#39;wishlist/item&amp;#39;)-&amp;gt;load($itemId);
$wishlist = Mage::getModel(&amp;#39;wishlist/wishlist&amp;#39;)-&amp;gt;loadByCode($code);
...
$item-&amp;gt;addToCart($cart);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant lines:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `SharedController.php:86` loads the wishlist item by global ID
- `SharedController.php:87` loads the wishlist by…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-665x-ppc4-685w</guid>
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