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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-290891</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290891</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-290891</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290891</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-40070</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40070</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier&amp;#39;s signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;direct&amp;#39;, the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;issuance&amp;#39;, the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;BSV Ruby SDK is the Ruby SDK for the BSV blockchain. From 0.3.1 to before 0.8.2, BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate persists certificate records to storage without verifying the certifier&amp;#39;s signature over the certificate contents. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;direct&amp;#39;, the caller supplies all certificate fields (including signature:) and the record is written to storage verbatim. In acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;issuance&amp;#39;, the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification. An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to list_certificates and prove_certificate.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-40070</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hc36-c89j-5f4j — bsv-sdk and bsv-wallet persist unverified certifier signatures in acquire_certificate (direct and issuance paths)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hc36-c89j-5f4j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: bsv-sdk, RubyGems: bsv-wallet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Unverified certifier signatures persisted by `acquire_certificate`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected packages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both `bsv-sdk` and `bsv-wallet` are published from the [sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk](https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk) repository. The vulnerable code lives in `lib/bsv/wallet_interface/wallet_client.rb`, which is **physically shipped inside both gems** (the `bsv-wallet.gemspec` `files` list bundles the entire `lib/bsv/wallet_interface/` tree). Consumers of either gem are independently vulnerable; the two packages are versioned separately, so each has its own affected range.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Package | Affected | Patched |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `bsv-sdk` | `&amp;gt;= 0.3.1, &amp;lt; 0.8.2` | `0.8.2` |
| `bsv-wallet` | `&amp;gt;= 0.1.2, &amp;lt; 0.3.4` | `0.3.4` |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate` persists certificate records to storage **without verifying the certifier&amp;#39;s signature** over the certificate contents. Both acquisition paths are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;direct&amp;#39;` — the caller supplies all certificate fields (including `signature:`) and the record is written to storage verbatim.
- `acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;issuance&amp;#39;` — the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to `list_certificates` and `prove_certificate`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BRC-52 requires…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: bsv-sdk, RubyGems: bsv-wallet&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Unverified certifier signatures persisted by `acquire_certificate`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected packages&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both `bsv-sdk` and `bsv-wallet` are published from the [sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk](https://github.com/sgbett/bsv-ruby-sdk) repository. The vulnerable code lives in `lib/bsv/wallet_interface/wallet_client.rb`, which is **physically shipped inside both gems** (the `bsv-wallet.gemspec` `files` list bundles the entire `lib/bsv/wallet_interface/` tree). Consumers of either gem are independently vulnerable; the two packages are versioned separately, so each has its own affected range.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Package | Affected | Patched |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `bsv-sdk` | `&amp;gt;= 0.3.1, &amp;lt; 0.8.2` | `0.8.2` |
| `bsv-wallet` | `&amp;gt;= 0.1.2, &amp;lt; 0.3.4` | `0.3.4` |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`BSV::Wallet::WalletClient#acquire_certificate` persists certificate records to storage **without verifying the certifier&amp;#39;s signature** over the certificate contents. Both acquisition paths are affected:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;direct&amp;#39;` — the caller supplies all certificate fields (including `signature:`) and the record is written to storage verbatim.
- `acquisition_protocol: &amp;#39;issuance&amp;#39;` — the client POSTs to a certifier URL and writes whatever signature the response body contains, also without verification.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can reach either API (or who controls a certifier endpoint targeted by the issuance path) can forge identity certificates that subsequently appear authentic to `list_certificates` and `prove_certificate`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BRC-52 requires…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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