Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-308749

fkie_cve-2026-40068

In versions 2.1.63 through 2.1.83 of Claude Code, the folder trust determination logic used the git worktree commondir file without validating its contents. An attacker could craft a malicious repository with a commondir file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, causing Claude Code to bypass its trust confirmation dialog and immediately execute hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploitation requires the victim to clone the malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and the attacker must know or guess a path the victim had already trusted. This issue has been fixed in version 2.1.84.

GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77 — Claude Code: Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution

Affected: npm: @anthropic-ai/claude-code

Claude Code used the git worktree `commondir` file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had already trusted.

Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.

Claude Code thanks [hackerone.com/masato_anzai](https://hackerone.com/masato_anzai) for reporting this issue.