https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 15 Oct 2026 10:20:37 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281081 EUVD-2026-281081 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281081 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35464 <p>pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. The fix for CVE-2026-33509 added an ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The storage_folder option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie. This vulnerability is fixed with commit c4cf995a2803bdbe388addfc2b0f323277efc0e1.</p> <p>pyLoad is a free and open-source download manager written in Python. The fix for CVE-2026-33509 added an ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The storage_folder option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie. This vulnerability is fixed with commit c4cf995a2803bdbe388addfc2b0f323277efc0e1.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35464 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4744-96p5-mp2j <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyload-ng</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an `ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS` set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The `storage_folder` option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.</p> <p>## Required Privileges</p> <p>The chain requires a single non-admin user with both `SETTINGS` (to change `storage_folder`) and `ADD` (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.</p> <p>## Root Cause</p> <p>`storage_folder` at `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:238-246` has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using `os.path.realpath`. However, Flask&#39;s filesystem session directory (`/tmp/pyLoad/flask/` in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.</p> <p>pyload configures Flask with `SESSION_TYPE = &#34;filesystem&#34;` at `__init__.py:127`. The cachelib `FileSystemCache` stores session files as `md5(&#34;session:&#34; + session_id)` and deserializes them with `pickle.load()` on every request that…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyload-ng</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an `ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS` set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The `storage_folder` option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.</p> <p>## Required Privileges</p> <p>The chain requires a single non-admin user with both `SETTINGS` (to change `storage_folder`) and `ADD` (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.</p> <p>## Root Cause</p> <p>`storage_folder` at `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:238-246` has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using `os.path.realpath`. However, Flask&#39;s filesystem session directory (`/tmp/pyLoad/flask/` in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.</p> <p>pyload configures Flask with `SESSION_TYPE = &#34;filesystem&#34;` at `__init__.py:127`. The cachelib `FileSystemCache` stores session files as `md5(&#34;session:&#34; + session_id)` and deserializes them with `pickle.load()` on every request that…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4744-96p5-mp2j https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2989 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyload-ng</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an `ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS` set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The `storage_folder` option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.</p> <p>## Required Privileges</p> <p>The chain requires a single non-admin user with both `SETTINGS` (to change `storage_folder`) and `ADD` (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.</p> <p>## Root Cause</p> <p>`storage_folder` at `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:238-246` has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using `os.path.realpath`. However, Flask&#39;s filesystem session directory (`/tmp/pyLoad/flask/` in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.</p> <p>pyload configures Flask with `SESSION_TYPE = &#34;filesystem&#34;` at `__init__.py:127`. The cachelib `FileSystemCache` stores session files as `md5(&#34;session:&#34; + session_id)` and deserializes them with `pickle.load()` on every request that…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: pyload-ng</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The fix for CVE-2026-33509 (GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx) added an `ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS` set to block non-admin users from modifying security-critical config options. The `storage_folder` option is not in this set and passes the existing path restriction because the Flask session directory is outside both PKGDIR and userdir. A user with SETTINGS and ADD permissions can redirect downloads to the Flask filesystem session store, plant a malicious pickle payload as a predictable session file, and trigger arbitrary code execution when any HTTP request arrives with the corresponding session cookie.</p> <p>## Required Privileges</p> <p>The chain requires a single non-admin user with both `SETTINGS` (to change `storage_folder`) and `ADD` (to submit a download URL) permissions. These are independent bitmask flags that can be assigned together by an admin. The final RCE trigger is unauthenticated: any HTTP request with the crafted session cookie causes deserialization.</p> <p>## Root Cause</p> <p>`storage_folder` at `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:238-246` has a path check that blocks writing inside PKGDIR or userdir using `os.path.realpath`. However, Flask&#39;s filesystem session directory (`/tmp/pyLoad/flask/` in the standard Docker deployment) is outside both restricted paths.</p> <p>pyload configures Flask with `SESSION_TYPE = &#34;filesystem&#34;` at `__init__.py:127`. The cachelib `FileSystemCache` stores session files as `md5(&#34;session:&#34; + session_id)` and deserializes them with `pickle.load()` on every request that…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2989