https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 15 Oct 2026 15:51:05 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292068 EUVD-2026-292068 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292068 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35402 <p>mcp-neo4j-cypher is an MCP server for executing Cypher queries against Neo4j databases. In versions prior to 0.6.0, the read_only mode enforcement can be bypassed using APOC CALL procedures, potentially allowing unauthorized write operations or server-side request forgery. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.</p> <p>mcp-neo4j-cypher is an MCP server for executing Cypher queries against Neo4j databases. In versions prior to 0.6.0, the read_only mode enforcement can be bypassed using APOC CALL procedures, potentially allowing unauthorized write operations or server-side request forgery. This issue is fixed in version 0.6.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35402 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x3cv-r3g3-fpg9 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-neo4j-cypher</p> <p>### Summary The `read_only` mode in `mcp-neo4j-cypher` versions prior to 0.6.0 can be bypassed using `CALL` procedures. ### Details</p> <p>#### Impact The enforcing of `read_only` mode in vulnerable versions could be bypassed by certain APOC procedures.</p> <p>#### Patches v0.6.0 release hardened the checks around the mode. The only way to guarantee the server actions is to limit the permissions of the db credentials available to the server.</p> <p>### Notes Impacts for server-side request forgery vulnerabilities may depend on both the configuration of the vulnerable system as well as the presence of other systems in the environment that could be accessed as part of exploitation. #### Recommended hardening</p> <p>- Limit the apoc procedures to what&#39;s required - [Manage data loading privileges](https://neo4j.com/docs/operations-manual/current/authentication-authorization/load-privileges/ ) - Don&#39;t relax the default settings without compensating controls - `apoc.import.file.enabled` is `false` by default - `apoc.import.file.use_neo4j_config` is `true` by default to restrict file imports to the import folder</p> <p>### Credits We want to publicly recognise the contribution of [Yotam Perkal](https://github.com/yotampe-pluto) from [Pluto Security](https://pluto.security/).</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-neo4j-cypher</p> <p>### Summary The `read_only` mode in `mcp-neo4j-cypher` versions prior to 0.6.0 can be bypassed using `CALL` procedures. ### Details</p> <p>#### Impact The enforcing of `read_only` mode in vulnerable versions could be bypassed by certain APOC procedures.</p> <p>#### Patches v0.6.0 release hardened the checks around the mode. The only way to guarantee the server actions is to limit the permissions of the db credentials available to the server.</p> <p>### Notes Impacts for server-side request forgery vulnerabilities may depend on both the configuration of the vulnerable system as well as the presence of other systems in the environment that could be accessed as part of exploitation. #### Recommended hardening</p> <p>- Limit the apoc procedures to what&#39;s required - [Manage data loading privileges](https://neo4j.com/docs/operations-manual/current/authentication-authorization/load-privileges/ ) - Don&#39;t relax the default settings without compensating controls - `apoc.import.file.enabled` is `false` by default - `apoc.import.file.use_neo4j_config` is `true` by default to restrict file imports to the import folder</p> <p>### Credits We want to publicly recognise the contribution of [Yotam Perkal](https://github.com/yotampe-pluto) from [Pluto Security](https://pluto.security/).</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x3cv-r3g3-fpg9 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2626 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-neo4j-cypher</p> <p>### Summary The `read_only` mode in `mcp-neo4j-cypher` versions prior to 0.6.0 can be bypassed using `CALL` procedures. ### Details</p> <p>#### Impact The enforcing of `read_only` mode in vulnerable versions could be bypassed by certain APOC procedures.</p> <p>#### Patches v0.6.0 release hardened the checks around the mode. The only way to guarantee the server actions is to limit the permissions of the db credentials available to the server.</p> <p>### Notes Impacts for server-side request forgery vulnerabilities may depend on both the configuration of the vulnerable system as well as the presence of other systems in the environment that could be accessed as part of exploitation. #### Recommended hardening</p> <p>- Limit the apoc procedures to what&#39;s required - [Manage data loading privileges](https://neo4j.com/docs/operations-manual/current/authentication-authorization/load-privileges/ ) - Don&#39;t relax the default settings without compensating controls - `apoc.import.file.enabled` is `false` by default - `apoc.import.file.use_neo4j_config` is `true` by default to restrict file imports to the import folder</p> <p>### Credits We want to publicly recognise the contribution of [Yotam Perkal](https://github.com/yotampe-pluto) from [Pluto Security](https://pluto.security/).</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: mcp-neo4j-cypher</p> <p>### Summary The `read_only` mode in `mcp-neo4j-cypher` versions prior to 0.6.0 can be bypassed using `CALL` procedures. ### Details</p> <p>#### Impact The enforcing of `read_only` mode in vulnerable versions could be bypassed by certain APOC procedures.</p> <p>#### Patches v0.6.0 release hardened the checks around the mode. The only way to guarantee the server actions is to limit the permissions of the db credentials available to the server.</p> <p>### Notes Impacts for server-side request forgery vulnerabilities may depend on both the configuration of the vulnerable system as well as the presence of other systems in the environment that could be accessed as part of exploitation. #### Recommended hardening</p> <p>- Limit the apoc procedures to what&#39;s required - [Manage data loading privileges](https://neo4j.com/docs/operations-manual/current/authentication-authorization/load-privileges/ ) - Don&#39;t relax the default settings without compensating controls - `apoc.import.file.enabled` is `false` by default - `apoc.import.file.use_neo4j_config` is `true` by default to restrict file imports to the import folder</p> <p>### Credits We want to publicly recognise the contribution of [Yotam Perkal](https://github.com/yotampe-pluto) from [Pluto Security](https://pluto.security/).</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-2626