https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 10:01:45 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281064 EUVD-2026-281064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281064 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35394 <p>Mobile Next is an MCP server for mobile development and automation. Prior to 0.0.50, the mobile_open_url tool in mobile-mcp passes user-supplied URLs directly to Android&#39;s intent system without any scheme validation, allowing execution of arbitrary Android intents, including USSD codes, phone calls, SMS messages, and content provider access. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.50.</p> <p>Mobile Next is an MCP server for mobile development and automation. Prior to 0.0.50, the mobile_open_url tool in mobile-mcp passes user-supplied URLs directly to Android&#39;s intent system without any scheme validation, allowing execution of arbitrary Android intents, including USSD codes, phone calls, SMS messages, and content provider access. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.50.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35394 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @mobilenext/mobile-mcp</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The `mobile_open_url` tool in mobile-mcp passes user-supplied URLs directly to Android&#39;s intent system without any scheme validation, allowing execution of arbitrary Android intents, including USSD codes, phone calls, SMS messages, and content provider access.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable code passes URLs directly to `adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d &lt;url&gt;` without checking the URL scheme. This can enable malicious schemes such as `tel:`, `sms:`, `mailto:`, `content://`, and `market://` to be executed.</p> <p>Since MCP servers are designed to be operated by AI agents, which are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, a malicious document or website could inject instructions that cause the AI to execute dangerous intents on a connected mobile device.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker via prompt injection can: - Execute USSD codes (e.g., `tel:*#06#` to display IMEI - confirmed on Pixel 7a, behavior varies by device; or device-specific factory reset codes) - Initiate phone calls to premium rate numbers - Draft SMS messages with attacker-controlled content - Access content providers (contacts, SMS, call logs) - Open app installation prompts</p> <p>### Proof of Concept ```json {&#34;jsonrpc&#34;:&#34;2.0&#34;,&#34;id&#34;:1,&#34;method&#34;:&#34;tools/call&#34;,&#34;params&#34;:{&#34;name&#34;:&#34;mobile_open_url&#34;,&#34;arguments&#34;:{&#34;device&#34;:&#34;&lt;id&gt;&#34;,&#34;url&#34;:&#34;tel:*#06#&#34;}}} ```</p> <p>Result: IMEI displayed on device. ```json {&#34;jsonrpc&#34;:&#34;2.0&#34;,&#34;id&#34;:1,&#34;method&#34;:&#34;tools/call&#34;,&#34;params&#34;:{&#34;name&#34;:&#34;mobile_open_url&#34;,&#34;arguments&#34;:{&#34;device&#34;:&#34;&lt;id&gt;&#34;,&#34;url&#34;:&#34;sm…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @mobilenext/mobile-mcp</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>The `mobile_open_url` tool in mobile-mcp passes user-supplied URLs directly to Android&#39;s intent system without any scheme validation, allowing execution of arbitrary Android intents, including USSD codes, phone calls, SMS messages, and content provider access.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerable code passes URLs directly to `adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d &lt;url&gt;` without checking the URL scheme. This can enable malicious schemes such as `tel:`, `sms:`, `mailto:`, `content://`, and `market://` to be executed.</p> <p>Since MCP servers are designed to be operated by AI agents, which are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, a malicious document or website could inject instructions that cause the AI to execute dangerous intents on a connected mobile device.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>An attacker via prompt injection can: - Execute USSD codes (e.g., `tel:*#06#` to display IMEI - confirmed on Pixel 7a, behavior varies by device; or device-specific factory reset codes) - Initiate phone calls to premium rate numbers - Draft SMS messages with attacker-controlled content - Access content providers (contacts, SMS, call logs) - Open app installation prompts</p> <p>### Proof of Concept ```json {&#34;jsonrpc&#34;:&#34;2.0&#34;,&#34;id&#34;:1,&#34;method&#34;:&#34;tools/call&#34;,&#34;params&#34;:{&#34;name&#34;:&#34;mobile_open_url&#34;,&#34;arguments&#34;:{&#34;device&#34;:&#34;&lt;id&gt;&#34;,&#34;url&#34;:&#34;tel:*#06#&#34;}}} ```</p> <p>Result: IMEI displayed on device. ```json {&#34;jsonrpc&#34;:&#34;2.0&#34;,&#34;id&#34;:1,&#34;method&#34;:&#34;tools/call&#34;,&#34;params&#34;:{&#34;name&#34;:&#34;mobile_open_url&#34;,&#34;arguments&#34;:{&#34;device&#34;:&#34;&lt;id&gt;&#34;,&#34;url&#34;:&#34;sm…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5qhv-x9j4-c3vm