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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 15:27:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-281011</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281011</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-281011</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281011</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-35036</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35036</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ech0 is an open-source, self-hosted publishing platform for personal idea sharing. Prior to 4.2.8, Ech0 implements link preview (editor fetches a page title) through GET /api/website/title. That is legitimate product behavior, but the implementation is unsafe: the route is unauthenticated, accepts a fully attacker-controlled URL, performs a server-side GET, reads the entire response body into memory (io.ReadAll). There is no host allowlist, no SSRF filter, and InsecureSkipVerify: true on the outbound client. Anyone who can reach the instance can force the Ech0 server to open HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice as seen from the server’s network position (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ech0 is an open-source, self-hosted publishing platform for personal idea sharing. Prior to 4.2.8, Ech0 implements link preview (editor fetches a page title) through GET /api/website/title. That is legitimate product behavior, but the implementation is unsafe: the route is unauthenticated, accepts a fully attacker-controlled URL, performs a server-side GET, reads the entire response body into memory (io.ReadAll). There is no host allowlist, no SSRF filter, and InsecureSkipVerify: true on the outbound client. Anyone who can reach the instance can force the Ech0 server to open HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice as seen from the server’s network position (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35036</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wc4h-2348-jc3p — Ech0 has Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in Website Preview Feature</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wc4h-2348-jc3p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/lin-snow/ech0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ech0 implements **link preview** (editor fetches a page title) through **`GET /api/website/title`**. That is **legitimate product behavior**, but the implementation is **unsafe**: the route is **unauthenticated**, accepts a **fully attacker-controlled URL**, performs a **server-side GET**, reads the **entire response body** into memory (`io.ReadAll`). There is **no** host allowlist, **no** SSRF filter, and **`InsecureSkipVerify: true`** on the outbound client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Attacker outcome :** Anyone who can reach the instance can **force the Ech0 server** to open **HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice** as seen from the **server’s network position** (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). 
Go’s default `http.Client` **follows redirects** (unless disabled). Redirect chains can move the server-side request from an allowed-looking host to an internal target; the code does not disable this in `SendRequest`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Ech0 codebase:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `internal/handler/common/common.go`  
  Handles the `/api/website/title` endpoint and accepts user-controlled URL input.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `internal/service/common/common.go`  
  Processes the request and invokes the outbound HTTP fetch (`GetWebsiteTitle`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `internal/util/http/http.go`  
  Performs the HTTP request (`SendRequest`) with the following insecure configurations:
  - No URL validation or allowlist
  - Redirects enabled (default client behavior)
  - `InsecureSkipVerify: true`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Environment:** Ech0 listenin…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/lin-snow/ech0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ech0 implements **link preview** (editor fetches a page title) through **`GET /api/website/title`**. That is **legitimate product behavior**, but the implementation is **unsafe**: the route is **unauthenticated**, accepts a **fully attacker-controlled URL**, performs a **server-side GET**, reads the **entire response body** into memory (`io.ReadAll`). There is **no** host allowlist, **no** SSRF filter, and **`InsecureSkipVerify: true`** on the outbound client.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Attacker outcome :** Anyone who can reach the instance can **force the Ech0 server** to open **HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice** as seen from the **server’s network position** (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). 
Go’s default `http.Client` **follows redirects** (unless disabled). Redirect chains can move the server-side request from an allowed-looking host to an internal target; the code does not disable this in `SendRequest`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Ech0 codebase:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `internal/handler/common/common.go`  
  Handles the `/api/website/title` endpoint and accepts user-controlled URL input.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `internal/service/common/common.go`  
  Processes the request and invokes the outbound HTTP fetch (`GetWebsiteTitle`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `internal/util/http/http.go`  
  Performs the HTTP request (`SendRequest`) with the following insecure configurations:
  - No URL validation or allowlist
  - Redirects enabled (default client behavior)
  - `InsecureSkipVerify: true`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Environment:** Ech0 listenin…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wc4h-2348-jc3p</guid>
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