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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-280218</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280218</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-280218</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280218</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34973</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34973</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the searchCustomPages() method in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php uses real_escape_string() (via escape()) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, real_escape_string() does not escape SQL LIKE metacharacters % (match any sequence) and _ (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the searchCustomPages() method in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php uses real_escape_string() (via escape()) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, real_escape_string() does not escape SQL LIKE metacharacters % (match any sequence) and _ (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34973</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gcp9-5jc8-976x — phpMyFAQ has a LIKE Wildcard Injection in Search.php — Unescaped % and _ Metacharacters Enable Broad Content Disclosure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcp9-5jc8-976x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `searchCustomPages()` method in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php` uses `real_escape_string()` (via `escape()`) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, `real_escape_string()` does **not** escape SQL LIKE metacharacters `%` (match any sequence) and `_` (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php`, lines 226–240&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code:**
```php
$escapedSearchTerm = $this-&amp;gt;configuration-&amp;gt;getDb()-&amp;gt;escape($searchTerm);
$searchWords = explode(&amp;#39; &amp;#39;, $escapedSearchTerm);
$searchConditions = [];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;foreach ($searchWords as $word) {
    if (strlen($word) &amp;lt;= 2) {
        continue;
    }
    $searchConditions[] = sprintf(
        &amp;#34;(page_title LIKE &amp;#39;%%%s%%&amp;#39; OR content LIKE &amp;#39;%%%s%%&amp;#39;)&amp;#34;,
        $word,
        $word
    );
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`escape()` calls `mysqli::real_escape_string()`, which escapes characters like `&amp;#39;`, `\`, `NULL`, etc. — but explicitly does **not** escape `%` or `_`, as these are not SQL string delimiters. They are, however, LIKE pattern wildcards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Attack vector:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user submits a search term containing `_` or `%` as part of a 3+ character word (to bypass the `strlen &amp;lt;= 2` filter). Examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Search for `a_b` → LIKE becomes `&amp;#39;%a_b%&amp;#39;` → `_` matches any single character, e.g. matche…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `searchCustomPages()` method in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php` uses `real_escape_string()` (via `escape()`) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, `real_escape_string()` does **not** escape SQL LIKE metacharacters `%` (match any sequence) and `_` (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File:** `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php`, lines 226–240&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code:**
```php
$escapedSearchTerm = $this-&amp;gt;configuration-&amp;gt;getDb()-&amp;gt;escape($searchTerm);
$searchWords = explode(&amp;#39; &amp;#39;, $escapedSearchTerm);
$searchConditions = [];&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;foreach ($searchWords as $word) {
    if (strlen($word) &amp;lt;= 2) {
        continue;
    }
    $searchConditions[] = sprintf(
        &amp;#34;(page_title LIKE &amp;#39;%%%s%%&amp;#39; OR content LIKE &amp;#39;%%%s%%&amp;#39;)&amp;#34;,
        $word,
        $word
    );
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`escape()` calls `mysqli::real_escape_string()`, which escapes characters like `&amp;#39;`, `\`, `NULL`, etc. — but explicitly does **not** escape `%` or `_`, as these are not SQL string delimiters. They are, however, LIKE pattern wildcards.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Attack vector:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A user submits a search term containing `_` or `%` as part of a 3+ character word (to bypass the `strlen &amp;lt;= 2` filter). Examples:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Search for `a_b` → LIKE becomes `&amp;#39;%a_b%&amp;#39;` → `_` matches any single character, e.g. matche…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gcp9-5jc8-976x</guid>
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