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EUVD-2026-337304

fkie_cve-2026-34780

Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. From versions 39.0.0-alpha.1 to before 39.8.0, 40.0.0-alpha.1 to before 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-alpha.1 to before 41.0.0-beta.8, apps that pass VideoFrame objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the contextBridge are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged VideoFrame to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script. Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a VideoFrame object to the main world via contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld(). Apps that do not bridge VideoFrame objects are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 39.8.0, 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-beta.8.

GHSA-jfqg-hf23-qpw2 — Electron: Context Isolation bypass via contextBridge VideoFrame transfer

Affected: npm: electron

### Impact Apps that pass `VideoFrame` objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the `contextBridge` are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged `VideoFrame` to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script.

Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a `VideoFrame` object to the main world via `contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld()`. Apps that do not bridge `VideoFrame` objects are not affected.

### Workarounds Do not pass `VideoFrame` objects across `contextBridge`. If an app needs to transfer video frame data, serialize it to an `ArrayBuffer` or `ImageBitmap` before bridging.

### Fixed Versions * `41.0.0-beta.8` * `40.7.0` * `39.8.0`

### For more information If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)