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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-280410</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280410</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-280410</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280410</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34773</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34773</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, and 41.0.0, on Windows, app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol) did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under HKCU\Software\Classes\, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers. Apps are only affected if they call app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient() with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, and 41.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to versions 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, and 41.0.0, on Windows, app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol) did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under HKCU\Software\Classes\, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers. Apps are only affected if they call app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient() with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 38.8.6, 39.8.1, 40.8.1, and 41.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34773</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr — Electron: Registry key path injection in app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient on Windows</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: electron&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
On Windows, `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol)` did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under `HKCU\Software\Classes\`, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apps are only affected if they call `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()` with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Validate the protocol name matches `/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*$/` before passing it to `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.1`
* `39.8.1`
* `38.8.6`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: electron&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
On Windows, `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol)` did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under `HKCU\Software\Classes\`, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Apps are only affected if they call `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()` with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds
Validate the protocol name matches `/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*$/` before passing it to `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0`
* `40.8.1`
* `39.8.1`
* `38.8.6`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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