https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 23:38:42 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280149 EUVD-2026-280149 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-280149 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34523 <p>SillyTavern is a locally installed user interface that allows users to interact with text generation large language models, image generation engines, and text-to-speech voice models. Prior to version 1.17.0, a path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server&#39;s filesystem. by sending percent-encoded &#34;../&#34; sequences (%2E%2E%2F) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files. This issue has been patched in version 1.17.0.</p> <p>SillyTavern is a locally installed user interface that allows users to interact with text generation large language models, image generation engines, and text-to-speech voice models. Prior to version 1.17.0, a path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server&#39;s filesystem. by sending percent-encoded &#34;../&#34; sequences (%2E%2E%2F) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files. This issue has been patched in version 1.17.0.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34523 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-525j-2hrj-m8fp <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sillytavern</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server&#39;s filesystem. By sending percent-encoded `../` sequences (`%2E%2E%2F`) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files (404 if it doesn&#39;t exist, 403 means it exists).</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerability is in `createRouteHandler` (`src/users.js:947–963`), which backs all user-data static file routes:</p> <p>```javascript function createRouteHandler(directoryFn) { return async (req, res) =&gt; { const directory = directoryFn(req); const filePath = decodeURIComponent(req.params[0]); const exists = fs.existsSync(path.join(directory, filePath)); // no boundary check here if (!exists) { return res.sendStatus(404); } return res.sendFile(filePath, { root: directory }); }; } ```</p> <p>`req.params[0]` contains the raw (percent-encoded) wildcard from the URL. After `decodeURIComponent`, a request path like `/characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira` decodes to `../../Users/kirakira`, and `path.join` resolves it outside the intended directory. `res.sendFile` correctly blocks the file from being served (the `send` module&#39;s root check returns 403), but `fs.existsSync` had already run, and the 403/404 distinction reveals the result.</p> <p>Affected routes (they all use the same handler, so they&#39;re all affected):</p> <p>- `/characters/*` - `/user/files…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: sillytavern</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>A path traversal vulnerability in the static file route handler allows any unauthenticated user to determine whether files exist anywhere on the server&#39;s filesystem. By sending percent-encoded `../` sequences (`%2E%2E%2F`) in requests to static file routes, an attacker can check for the existence of files (404 if it doesn&#39;t exist, 403 means it exists).</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>The vulnerability is in `createRouteHandler` (`src/users.js:947–963`), which backs all user-data static file routes:</p> <p>```javascript function createRouteHandler(directoryFn) { return async (req, res) =&gt; { const directory = directoryFn(req); const filePath = decodeURIComponent(req.params[0]); const exists = fs.existsSync(path.join(directory, filePath)); // no boundary check here if (!exists) { return res.sendStatus(404); } return res.sendFile(filePath, { root: directory }); }; } ```</p> <p>`req.params[0]` contains the raw (percent-encoded) wildcard from the URL. After `decodeURIComponent`, a request path like `/characters/%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%2FUsers/kirakira` decodes to `../../Users/kirakira`, and `path.join` resolves it outside the intended directory. `res.sendFile` correctly blocks the file from being served (the `send` module&#39;s root check returns 403), but `fs.existsSync` had already run, and the 403/404 distinction reveals the result.</p> <p>Affected routes (they all use the same handler, so they&#39;re all affected):</p> <p>- `/characters/*` - `/user/files…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-525j-2hrj-m8fp