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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 15:32:17 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-278496</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278496</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-278496</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278496</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34384</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34384</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.8, the create_user, assign_member, and assign_user action modes in modules/registration.php approve pending user registrations via GET request without validating a CSRF token. Unlike the delete_user mode in the same file (which correctly validates the token), these three approval actions read their parameters from $_GET and perform irreversible state changes without any protection. An attacker who has submitted a pending registration can extract their own user UUID from the registration confirmation email URL, then trick any user with the rol_approve_users right into visiting a crafted URL that automatically approves the registration. This bypasses the manual registration approval workflow entirely. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Admidio is an open-source user management solution. Prior to version 5.0.8, the create_user, assign_member, and assign_user action modes in modules/registration.php approve pending user registrations via GET request without validating a CSRF token. Unlike the delete_user mode in the same file (which correctly validates the token), these three approval actions read their parameters from $_GET and perform irreversible state changes without any protection. An attacker who has submitted a pending registration can extract their own user UUID from the registration confirmation email URL, then trick any user with the rol_approve_users right into visiting a crafted URL that automatically approves the registration. This bypasses the manual registration approval workflow entirely. This issue has been patched in version 5.0.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34384</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-ph84-r98x-2j22 — Admidio has Missing CSRF Protection on Registration Approval Actions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ph84-r98x-2j22</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The create_user, assign_member, and assign_user action modes in modules/registration.php approve pending user registrations via GET request without validating a CSRF token. Unlike the delete_user mode in the same file (which correctly validates the token), these three approval actions read their parameters from $_GET and perform irreversible state changes without any protection. An attacker who has submitted a pending registration can extract their own user UUID from the registration confirmation email URL, then trick any user with the rol_approve_users right into visiting a crafted URL that automatically approves the registration. This bypasses the manual registration approval workflow entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### CSRF Protection Is Present for delete_user but Absent for Approval Modes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File: modules/registration.php, lines 90-128&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The delete_user mode validates the CSRF token (line 99), but the three approval modes do not:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// assign_member and assign_user: no CSRF check
} elseif (in_array($getMode, array(&amp;#39;assign_member&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;assign_user&amp;#39;))) {
    $registrationService = new RegistrationService($gDb, $getUserUUID);
    $message = $registrationService-&amp;gt;assignRegistration($getUserUUIDAssigned, $getMode === &amp;#39;assign_member&amp;#39;);
    $gMessage-&amp;gt;setForwardUrl($message[&amp;#39;forwardUrl&amp;#39;]);
    $gMessage-&amp;gt;show($message[&amp;#39;message&amp;#39;]);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// create_user: no CSRF check
} elseif ($getMode === &amp;#39;create_user&amp;#39;) {
    $registrationUser-&amp;gt;acceptRegistration();
    if ($gCurrentUser-&amp;gt;isAdmin…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: admidio/admidio&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The create_user, assign_member, and assign_user action modes in modules/registration.php approve pending user registrations via GET request without validating a CSRF token. Unlike the delete_user mode in the same file (which correctly validates the token), these three approval actions read their parameters from $_GET and perform irreversible state changes without any protection. An attacker who has submitted a pending registration can extract their own user UUID from the registration confirmation email URL, then trick any user with the rol_approve_users right into visiting a crafted URL that automatically approves the registration. This bypasses the manual registration approval workflow entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### CSRF Protection Is Present for delete_user but Absent for Approval Modes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;File: modules/registration.php, lines 90-128&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The delete_user mode validates the CSRF token (line 99), but the three approval modes do not:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
// assign_member and assign_user: no CSRF check
} elseif (in_array($getMode, array(&amp;#39;assign_member&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;assign_user&amp;#39;))) {
    $registrationService = new RegistrationService($gDb, $getUserUUID);
    $message = $registrationService-&amp;gt;assignRegistration($getUserUUIDAssigned, $getMode === &amp;#39;assign_member&amp;#39;);
    $gMessage-&amp;gt;setForwardUrl($message[&amp;#39;forwardUrl&amp;#39;]);
    $gMessage-&amp;gt;show($message[&amp;#39;message&amp;#39;]);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// create_user: no CSRF check
} elseif ($getMode === &amp;#39;create_user&amp;#39;) {
    $registrationUser-&amp;gt;acceptRegistration();
    if ($gCurrentUser-&amp;gt;isAdmin…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-ph84-r98x-2j22</guid>
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