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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 07:39:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-278195</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278195</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-278195</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278195</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34369</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34369</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly. Commit be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly. Commit be344206f2f461c034ad2f1c5d8212dd8a52b8c7 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34369</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-q6jj-r49p-94fh — AVideo has Video Password Protection Bypass via API Endpoints Returning Full Playback Sources Without Password Verifica…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6jj-r49p-94fh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The video password protection is enforced in the web UI via `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` (`plugin/CustomizeUser/CustomizeUser.php:787`), which calls `videoPasswordIsGood()` before rendering the video player. However, this hook is only invoked during web page rendering — the API endpoints bypass it entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable endpoint 1 — `get_api_video_file` (`plugin/API/API.php:986-1004`):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function get_api_video_file($parameters)
{
    global $global;
    $obj = $this-&amp;gt;startResponseObject($parameters);
    $obj-&amp;gt;videos_id = $parameters[&amp;#39;videos_id&amp;#39;];
    if (!self::isAPISecretValid()) {
        if (!User::canWatchVideoWithAds($obj-&amp;gt;videos_id)) {
            return new ApiObject(&amp;#34;You cannot watch this video&amp;#34;);
        }
    }
    $video = new Video(&amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, $obj-&amp;gt;videos_id);
    $obj-&amp;gt;filename = $video-&amp;gt;getFilename();
    // ...
    $obj-&amp;gt;video_file = Video::getHigherVideoPathFromID($obj-&amp;gt;videos_id);
    $obj-&amp;gt;sources = getSources($obj-&amp;gt;filename…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `get_api_video_file` and `get_api_video` API endpoints in AVideo return full video playback sources (direct MP4 URLs, HLS manifests) for password-protected videos without verifying the video password. While the normal web playback flow enforces password checks via the `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` hook, this enforcement is completely absent from the API code path. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve direct playback URLs for any password-protected video by calling the API directly.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The video password protection is enforced in the web UI via `CustomizeUser::getModeYouTube()` (`plugin/CustomizeUser/CustomizeUser.php:787`), which calls `videoPasswordIsGood()` before rendering the video player. However, this hook is only invoked during web page rendering — the API endpoints bypass it entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable endpoint 1 — `get_api_video_file` (`plugin/API/API.php:986-1004`):**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function get_api_video_file($parameters)
{
    global $global;
    $obj = $this-&amp;gt;startResponseObject($parameters);
    $obj-&amp;gt;videos_id = $parameters[&amp;#39;videos_id&amp;#39;];
    if (!self::isAPISecretValid()) {
        if (!User::canWatchVideoWithAds($obj-&amp;gt;videos_id)) {
            return new ApiObject(&amp;#34;You cannot watch this video&amp;#34;);
        }
    }
    $video = new Video(&amp;#39;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, $obj-&amp;gt;videos_id);
    $obj-&amp;gt;filename = $video-&amp;gt;getFilename();
    // ...
    $obj-&amp;gt;video_file = Video::getHigherVideoPathFromID($obj-&amp;gt;videos_id);
    $obj-&amp;gt;sources = getSources($obj-&amp;gt;filename…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-q6jj-r49p-94fh</guid>
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