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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 15:49:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-278445</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278445</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-278445</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278445</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34360</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34360</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, the /loadIG HTTP endpoint in the FHIR Validator HTTP service accepts a user-supplied URL via JSON body and makes server-side HTTP requests to it without any hostname, scheme, or domain validation. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the validator can probe internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and map network topology through error-based information leakage. With explore=true (the default for this code path), each request triggers multiple outbound HTTP calls, amplifying reconnaissance capability. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, the /loadIG HTTP endpoint in the FHIR Validator HTTP service accepts a user-supplied URL via JSON body and makes server-side HTTP requests to it without any hostname, scheme, or domain validation. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the validator can probe internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and map network topology through error-based information leakage. With explore=true (the default for this code path), each request triggers multiple outbound HTTP calls, amplifying reconnaissance capability. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34360</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3ww8-jw56-9f5h — FHIR Validator: Unauthenticated Blind SSRF via /loadIG Endpoint Enables Internal Network Probing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3ww8-jw56-9f5h</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/loadIG` HTTP endpoint in the FHIR Validator HTTP service accepts a user-supplied URL via JSON body and makes server-side HTTP requests to it without any hostname, scheme, or domain validation. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the validator can probe internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and map network topology through error-based information leakage. With `explore=true` (the default for this code path), each request triggers multiple outbound HTTP calls, amplifying reconnaissance capability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause chain:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `LoadIGHTTPHandler.handle()` reads the `ig` field from user-supplied JSON and passes it directly to `IgLoader.loadIg()` with no validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// LoadIGHTTPHandler.java:35,43
String ig = wrapper.asString(&amp;#34;ig&amp;#34;);
engine.getIgLoader().loadIg(engine.getIgs(), engine.getBinaries(), ig, false);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `loadIg()` calls `loadIgSource(srcPackage, recursive, true)` with `explore=true` (IgLoader.java:153).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. `loadIgSource()` checks `Common.isNetworkPath(src)` which only verifies the URL starts with `http:` or `https:` — no host/IP validation (Common.java:14-16).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4. The URL reaches `ManagedWebAccess.get()` which calls `inAllowedPaths()`. This check is a no-op by default because `allowedDomains` is initialized as an empty list, and the code explicitly returns `true` when empty:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// ManagedWebAccess.java:104-106
static boolean inAllowedPaths(String pathname) {
    if (allowedDomains.isEmpty())…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `/loadIG` HTTP endpoint in the FHIR Validator HTTP service accepts a user-supplied URL via JSON body and makes server-side HTTP requests to it without any hostname, scheme, or domain validation. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the validator can probe internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and map network topology through error-based information leakage. With `explore=true` (the default for this code path), each request triggers multiple outbound HTTP calls, amplifying reconnaissance capability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Root cause chain:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `LoadIGHTTPHandler.handle()` reads the `ig` field from user-supplied JSON and passes it directly to `IgLoader.loadIg()` with no validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// LoadIGHTTPHandler.java:35,43
String ig = wrapper.asString(&amp;#34;ig&amp;#34;);
engine.getIgLoader().loadIg(engine.getIgs(), engine.getBinaries(), ig, false);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. `loadIg()` calls `loadIgSource(srcPackage, recursive, true)` with `explore=true` (IgLoader.java:153).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. `loadIgSource()` checks `Common.isNetworkPath(src)` which only verifies the URL starts with `http:` or `https:` — no host/IP validation (Common.java:14-16).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;4. The URL reaches `ManagedWebAccess.get()` which calls `inAllowedPaths()`. This check is a no-op by default because `allowedDomains` is initialized as an empty list, and the code explicitly returns `true` when empty:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```java
// ManagedWebAccess.java:104-106
static boolean inAllowedPaths(String pathname) {
    if (allowedDomains.isEmpty())…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3ww8-jw56-9f5h</guid>
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