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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-278784</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278784</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-278784</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278784</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34243</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34243</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;wenxian is a tool to generate BIBTEX files from given identifiers (DOI, PMID, arXiv ID, or paper title). In versions 0.3.1 and prior, a GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from issue_comment.body directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;wenxian is a tool to generate BIBTEX files from given identifiers (DOI, PMID, arXiv ID, or paper title). In versions 0.3.1 and prior, a GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from issue_comment.body directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34243</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r4fj-r33x-8v88 — wenxian: Command Injection in GitHub Actions Workflow via `issue_comment.body`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r4fj-r33x-8v88</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; GitHub Actions: njzjz/wenxian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from `issue_comment.body` directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The workflow is triggered by `issue_comment`, which can be controlled by external users.
In the following step:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
echo identifiers=$(echo &amp;#34;${{ github.event.comment.body }}&amp;#34; | grep -oE &amp;#39;@njzjz-bot .*&amp;#39; | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) &amp;gt;&amp;gt; $GITHUB_OUTPUT
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;the value of `github.event.comment.body` is directly interpolated into a shell command inside `run:`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since GitHub Actions evaluates `${{ }}` before execution, attacker-controlled input is injected into the shell context without sanitization. This creates a command injection risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the extracted value is later reused in another step that constructs output using backticks:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
echo &amp;#39;@${{ github.event.comment.user.login }} Here is the BibTeX entry for `${{ steps.extract-identifiers.outputs.identifiers }}`:&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which may further propagate unsafe content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Go to an issue in the repository
2. Post a comment such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`@njzjz-bot paper123&amp;#34; ) ; whoami ; #
`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. Observe whether the command is executed or reflected in logs/output
&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;658&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;203&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;poc&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/084ac264-8cb9-4721-8279-26a1da9b891f&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The injected payload successfully breaks out of the quoted context and executes arbitrary shell commands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As shown in t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; GitHub Actions: njzjz/wenxian&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A GitHub Actions workflow uses untrusted user input from `issue_comment.body` directly inside a shell command, allowing potential command injection and arbitrary code execution on the runner.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The workflow is triggered by `issue_comment`, which can be controlled by external users.
In the following step:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
echo identifiers=$(echo &amp;#34;${{ github.event.comment.body }}&amp;#34; | grep -oE &amp;#39;@njzjz-bot .*&amp;#39; | head -n1 | cut -c12- | xargs) &amp;gt;&amp;gt; $GITHUB_OUTPUT
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;the value of `github.event.comment.body` is directly interpolated into a shell command inside `run:`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since GitHub Actions evaluates `${{ }}` before execution, attacker-controlled input is injected into the shell context without sanitization. This creates a command injection risk.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, the extracted value is later reused in another step that constructs output using backticks:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
echo &amp;#39;@${{ github.event.comment.user.login }} Here is the BibTeX entry for `${{ steps.extract-identifiers.outputs.identifiers }}`:&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;which may further propagate unsafe content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Go to an issue in the repository
2. Post a comment such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`@njzjz-bot paper123&amp;#34; ) ; whoami ; #
`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;3. Observe whether the command is executed or reflected in logs/output
&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;658&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;203&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;poc&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/084ac264-8cb9-4721-8279-26a1da9b891f&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The injected payload successfully breaks out of the quoted context and executes arbitrary shell commands.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As shown in t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r4fj-r33x-8v88</guid>
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