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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-277798</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277798</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-277798</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277798</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-33766</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33766</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, `isSSRFSafeURL()` validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but `url_get_contents()` follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target. Commit 8b7e9dad359d5fac69e0cbbb370250e0b284bc12 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, `isSSRFSafeURL()` validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but `url_get_contents()` follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target. Commit 8b7e9dad359d5fac69e0cbbb370250e0b284bc12 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33766</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f359-r3pv-2phf — AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect in Image Download Endpoints</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-f359-r3pv-2phf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`isSSRFSafeURL()` validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but `url_get_contents()` follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Check-time:** `isSSRFSafeURL()` at `objects/functions.php:4066` resolves the hostname and validates the IP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Use-time:** `url_get_contents()` at `objects/functions.php:1990` calls `file_get_contents()` with PHP&amp;#39;s default `follow_location=1` — redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected endpoint:** `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:
```php
if (isValidURL($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;downloadURL_image&amp;#39;]) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;downloadURL_image&amp;#39;])) {
    $content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;downloadURL_image&amp;#39;]);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker sets up `https://attacker.com/redir` to respond with `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`
2. Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:
```
GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&amp;amp;...
```
3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` resolves `attacker.com` → public IP → passes validation
4. `url_get_contents()` follows 302 redirect to `169.254.169.254` → SSRF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
- Internal netwo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: wwbn/avideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`isSSRFSafeURL()` validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but `url_get_contents()` follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Check-time:** `isSSRFSafeURL()` at `objects/functions.php:4066` resolves the hostname and validates the IP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Use-time:** `url_get_contents()` at `objects/functions.php:1990` calls `file_get_contents()` with PHP&amp;#39;s default `follow_location=1` — redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected endpoint:** `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:
```php
if (isValidURL($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;downloadURL_image&amp;#39;]) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;downloadURL_image&amp;#39;])) {
    $content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST[&amp;#39;downloadURL_image&amp;#39;]);
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker sets up `https://attacker.com/redir` to respond with `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`
2. Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:
```
GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&amp;amp;...
```
3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` resolves `attacker.com` → public IP → passes validation
4. `url_get_contents()` follows 302 redirect to `169.254.169.254` → SSRF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
- Internal netwo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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